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Abstract
This thesis consists of two chapters that investigate two important issues in banking of
the past decade: the effect of banking consolidation on the borrowers and the regulatory
capital requirements for banks.
The first chapter analyzes the effect of bank mergers on loan prices, and the welfare
implications for borrowers. In particular I test the hypothesis that mergers create
efficiency gains which are, in fact, passed on to borrowers through a reduction in interest
rates. The alternative hypothesis is that mergers lead to greater market concentration and
in turn an increase in the cost of capital for borrowers. Using a proprietary loan-level data
set for U.S. commercial banks, I find that acquiring banks, on average, reduce the spreads
on their new commercial and industrial loans after a merger. The reduction in loan
spreads is both larger and also more persistent for the smaller acquirers, with total gross
assets less than $10 billion. These findings seem to be driven by cost efficiencies due to
mergers, since the results are stronger for the sample of acquirers with larger than median
declines in their operating costs after their mergers. Moreover, the reduction in spreads is
much larger if the acquirer and the target have some geographical overlap of markets
before the merger, and, consequently, more potential for cost savings. However, if the
market overlap is so extensive as to significantly increase market concentration, market
power effects dominate and loan spreads, on average increase. The findings are robust to
using variation in dates of intrastate banking deregulation as an exogenous instrument for
the timing of the in-market mergers. Contrary to what might be expected, bigger
acquirers do not impose less favorable pricing terms for small businesses seeking to
borrow. Indeed, the reduction in spreads is significant for small loans, showing that small
borrowers typically pay lower interest rates to banks that have expanded during the
previous few years through mergers.
The second chapter models the incentives of banks to undertake "Regulatory Capital
Arbitrage" (RCA), under the current capital adequacy rules. RCA is a substitution of
high-risk assets for low-risk assets with no requirement to increase their risk-based
regulatory capital. I show that in equilibrium banks making risky investments pool with
the banks investing safely so that they can be subject to a lower amount of regulatory
capital because the risk exposures of banks cannot be precisely measured. The chapter
examines whether the proposed "Basel II" regulatory system would be more or less
efficient and effective than the current system. Under the Basel II rules, banks will have
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an option to use their own internal risk assessment systems in determining their
regulatory capital as long as they satisfy infrastructure requirements of the supervisors. I
show that this Internal Ratings-based (IRB) Approach of Basel II can be interpreted as a
way of forcing a separating equilibrium, in which good banks that do not pursue unduly
risky strategies identify themselves to the regulators and are rewarded with a lower
capital requirement. Such a separating equilibrium can only be sustained under an
effective supervision system or by giving some incentives to the excessively risk-taking
banks to stay in the current system rather than opting into the new IRB approach.
Thesis Supervisor: Stewart C. Myers
Title: Gordon Y. Billard Professor of Finance
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen A. Ross
Title: Franco Modigliani Professor of Finance & Economics
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1 Chapter 1
The Effect of Bank Mergers
on Loan Prices:
Evidence from the U.S.
1.1 Introduction
During 1980-2003, total assets held by the 10 largest commercial banks in the U.S.
increased from 22% to 46% of the industry assets while their deposits increased from
19% to 41% of the industry deposits (Pilloff (2004)). This fact is primarily because
of the substantial increase in banking consolidation in the past decade.1 Hannan
and Prager (1998) show that mega-mergers, which increase the concentration of the
banking markets in the U.S., create unfavorable interest rates on deposits. In this
chapter, I analyze the effect on borrowers and address the question of whether or not
bank mergers benefit borrowers in the U.S. The reason for my choice of banking-firm
mergers is the potential effect of the changes in loan prices or credit availability to
small businesses on the real investment and the economy in general.
My goal, in particular, is to provide an understanding of the effect of bank merg-
ers on loan prices, and to investigate whether or not value created by mergers is
passed on to the borrowers through reductions in interest rates. For this purpose, I
use a confidential loan-level data set from the Federal Reserve Board, which covers
the characteristics of the new commercial and industrial (C&I) loan extensions of a
stratified sample of U.S. commercial banks. Since the data include nearly all of the
largest acquirers, my merger sample spans 62% of all the acquirer assets and 51% of
all the target assets in the U.S. during 1990-2000.
The literature exploring the effect of banking consolidation on borrowers focuses
1Figure 1.1, showing a part of the Bank of America's family tree, is a good representative of the
banking consolidation during the 1990s.
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on two main issues. The first is the effect of bank mergers on credit availability
to small businesses (e.g., Keeton (1996), Strahan and Weston (1998), Berger et al.
(1998), Sapienza (2002), Degryse et al. (2005)); and the second one is the effect on
loan prices (e.g., Akhavein et al. (1997), Sapienza (2002)). However, these papers
analyzing the pricing effect of mergers use either aggregate bank-level data or data
from other countries. To my knowledge, this is the first study to use loan-level data
for C&I loans of U.S. banks in order to dynamically examine the effect of commercial
bank mergers on loan prices.
I analyze acquiring banks before and after the merger. After carefully controlling
for a number of loan characteristics, my findings show that they pass their efficiency
gains on to the borrowers as more favorable interest rates on the new extensions of
their C&I loans after the mergers. The average reduction in spreads on loans, within
the three years after the merger, is both larger and also more persistent for the non-
mega acquirers, with total gross assets less than $10 billion. Most importantly, the
decline in spreads after the mergers is significant for small business loans, with loan
sizes less than $1 million. This finding is especially important since, by showing that
mergers result in better prices for small loans, I provide evidence of favorable effects
of banking consolidation for small businesses. Contrary to what might be expected,
bigger acquirers do not impose less favorable pricing terms for small businesses. In-
deed, my findings show that small borrowers typically pay lower interest rates to
banks that have expanded during the previous few years through mergers.
This chapter explains the after-merger reductions in spreads by some cost efficien-
cies reflected in loan spreads primarily because of the following results. First, the
operating cost ratio of the acquiring bank after the merger is compared to the same
ratio of the pro-forma bank (target plus acquirer before the merger). The reduction in
spreads is found to be significantly greater for the acquirers with larger than median
decline in their operating cost ratios than for the acquirers with smaller than median
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decline in their operating cost ratios.
Second, my analyses differentiate different types of mergers based on the geo-
graphical market overlap between the acquirer and the target before the merger, and
the results are consistent with what theory would imply regarding the different effects
of in-market and out-of-market mergers on loan prices. In-market mergers, where the
acquirer and the target were operating in at least one common banking market be-
fore the merger, could create opportunities for exercising market power by increasing
the concentration of these banking markets. However, when compared to the out-of-
market mergers, in-market mergers also offer much more potential for cost savings
through elimination of the least efficient of the overlapping branches or consolidation
of the operations. Consistent with the predictions of the theories on potential effi-
ciency and market power effects of the in-market mergers, the reduction in spreads
is the most significant if the acquirer and the target have some overlap of markets
before the merger. However, this result is true only if the overlap is not so extensive
as to significantly increase the market power of the acquirer, in which case market
power effect outweighs and spreads on loans significantly increase after the mergers.
For the out-of market acquirers, with no geographical market overlap with the tar-
get before -the merger, the potential for efficiency gains through consolidating opera-
tions or closing the least efficient of the overlapping branches does not exist. However,
the consolidated bank could enjoy some other efficiencies, such as scale efficiencies or
risk diversification. Moreover, acquirers could have a very different strategy after the
out-of-market mergers: in the new markets they enter, they could try to gain more
market share by offering lower rates than the target and the rival banks used to offer
before the merger. My analyses show that the reduction in loan prices is on average
lower and statistically less significant for out-of-market mergers than for in-market
mergers.
In order to test for the motives for the strategic price cut of the out-of-market
12
acquirers, I add one more layer to my tests and incorporate the structure of the
target's markets into my regressions. I check whether the change in spreads after
the market extension mergers of the large acquirers is affected by whether targets'
markets were dominated by large or small banks before the merger. Only if the new
markets entered through the merger were dominated by larger banks, are acquirers
found to be significantly reducing spreads on large loans starting within the first year
after the merger. This occurs because in a market dominated by small banks, a big
acquirer would already be more efficient and therefore charging lower prices on a given
loan than the prices of the existing small-sized competitors.
I further examine whether my results are driven by any after-merger change in
the quality of the acquirers' loan portfolios. First, I show that there is no significant
change in the extent of nonperforming loans of the acquirer after the merger. Second,
I explore the possibility of shifts in the volume of loans with certain characteristics
within the portfolio of the acquirer after the merger. The results show either no
change or change in the direction that would, in fact, bias my results in the opposite
direction. Both checks provide more support for the conclusions of this chapter.
In order to alleviate concerns regarding the endogeneity of the timing of the merg-
ers in my sample, I used an exogenous instrument, the variation in banking deregu-
lation across states, for the dates of the mergers. Banking literature recognizes the
removal of intrastate and interstate banking restrictions as the main reason for the
huge increase in the number of mergers in the 1990s. Therefore, in order to analyze
the indirect effect of the deregulation on loan spreads, I also ran my basic tests at
the banking market level by using the dates of intrastate deregulation instead of the
dates of the in-market mergers. After controlling for the increase in market competi-
tion due to deregulation, my regressions result in both statistically and economically
significant decline in spreads starting within the third year after the deregulation.
Lastly, in order to complement the chapter's findings related to loan prices, I also
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analyzed the effect of bank mergers on small business lending of the merging banks.
For that purpose, bank-level data on the aggregate quantities of small business lending
are used. However, the data are available only after 1993, and are annual. Therefore,
the tests exploring the effect of bank mergers on credit availability are not in as much
detail as the tests on loan spreads, and I acknowledge the possibility that very risky
small borrowers of the target might be credit-rationed after the merger. However,
a simple mean difference test shows that, on average, the ratio of small business
lending to total assets of the acquirer after the merger is not significantly different
than the same ratio of the pro-forma bank (target plus acquirer) before the merger.
Credit availability to small businesses from large banks could have been increasing,
especially since the late 1990s, due to some new technologies applied to commercial
bank lending, such as credit scoring models, which enable small businesses to provide
some "hard" information to the banks. This study, therefore, complements Petersen
and Rajan (2002), which shows that the physical distance between small businesses
and their banks has been increasing, in providing evidence for the possible increase
in small borrowers in large banks' loan portfolios.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The rest of this section
discusses possible effects of banking consolidation on loan prices and credit availabil-
ity, states the main hypotheses to be tested in this study, and reviews the related
literature. Section 1.2 describes the data and my sample. Section 1.3 presents the
statistical methodology, defines the variables, and shows the main results as well as
results for some subsamples of mergers and loans. In Section 1.4, the market overlap
between the acquirer and the targets, and also the competitiveness of the targets'
markets, are incorporated into the analyses. Section 1.5 provides additional robust-
ness checks for the efficiency gains. Section 1.6 uses the variation in the dates of
banking deregulation as an exogenous instrument for the timing of the mergers. Sec-
tion 1.7 briefly explores the effect of mergers on credit availability to small businesses.
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Section 1.8 discusses the findings of this chapter and presents its conclusions.
1.1.1 Potential Effects of Mergers on Loan Prices
Effects of bank mergers on loan prices are ex-ante uncertain. For instance, merg-
ers may increase the efficiency through synergy gains and growth or through re-
optimization of the loan portfolios and risk diversification.2 The evidence on whether
these efficiency gains are reflected in combined stock returns of the merging banks
around the merger announcement is mixed.3 However, insignificant results could be
due to some information that the stock price incorporates other than the efficiencies,
such as the negative signaling of overvalued stock (Houston and Ryngaert (1997)), or
simply because these mergers are largely expected (Houston et al. (2001)). Houston
et al. (2001) show that, unlike the 1980s, combined stock returns to the bidders and
targets are higher in 1990s, and the cost savings due to increased frequency of "in-
market" mergers constituted the primary source of these bank-merger gains. On the
other hand, according to Calomiris and Karceski (1999), insignificant stock returns
to the combined bank could be due to the fact that, in a competitive market, sig-
nificant portion of the efficiency gains are passed on the bank customers; therefore,
transaction costs or interest rate spreads might be more useful measures of efficiency
gains than stock prices.4
Holding characteristics of the loans constant, if efficiency gains are passed on to
the borrowers, interest rates would be expected to decline. However, if merging banks
have significant overlap in their markets of operation, the merger could increase the
2See Berger et al. (1999) for a detailed description of different types of efficiency consequences
for banks. The empirical evidence on post-merger accounting performance is mixed. (See, Berger
and Humphrey (11992), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Toevs (1992), Pilloff (1996), Akhavein et al.
(1997), and Berger (1997), etc.)
3 See James and Weir (1987), Hannan and Wolken (1989), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Houston
and Ryngaert (1994), DeLong (1998), Kane (2000), and Houston et al. (2001), etc.
4 See also Penas and Unal (2004), analyzing the commercial bank mergers between 1991 and 1998,
show that risk- and maturity- adjusted returns of the bondholders of both the acquirer and the target
around the merger announcement month are significantly positive and these results are not due to
wealth transfers from shareholders to bondholders since equity holders also realize positive returns.
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concentration in these banking markets and, consequently, the market power of the
consolidated bank.5 If the acquirer chooses to exercise market power after the merger,
interest rates on loans would instead be expected to increase. Existing empirical litera-
ture on concentration in banking markets illustrates this positive relationship between
market concentration and higher prices on loan contracts (Hannan (1991)) and on de-
posits (Berger and Hannan (1989)). Therefore, the net effect on loan prices would
depend on whether these market power or efficiency effects dominate (Williamson
(1968, 1975)).
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) argue that there might be an asymmetry in how
fast these effects occur. By analyzing the changes in deposit rates after the in-
market mergers in Italy, they provide evidence that the gestation period for the
efficiency gains to be realized could be up to three years after the merger. Due to
data limitations, the literature on the pricing effect of mergers in the U.S. is limited.6
There exists some empirical evidence on the unfavorable results of increased market
concentration due to big bank mergers on deposit rates (Hannan and Prager (1998)),
on personal loan rates in 10 U.S. cities (Kahn et al. (2005)), and on real-estate
loan rates (Garmaise and Moskowitz (2004)). On the other hand, Drucker (2005)
shows that, commercial banking mergers among the 50 largest banks do not result in
significant changes in the pricing of their large syndicated loan contracts. Drucker
(2005) mainly concentrates on the effect of mergers between commercial banks and
investment banks during 1997-2003 by using a limited sample of mega banks and their
5 Rhoades (2000) documents that mergers are the main source of changes in banking structure
and competition between 1990-1998 since newly chartered banks and bank failures are considerably
smaller in number. Therefore, this study concentrates only on the mergers and their effect on
banking concentration.
6On the theory side, the only theory paper on this topic, to my knowledge, is by Park and
Pennacchi (2005). They concentrate on market extension mergers by large multi-market banks into
a new market of smaller bank competitors. They argue that these mergers, given that they do not
change the market concentration, increase the retail loan competition (benefiting borrowers), but
reduce the retail deposit competition (harming depositors). The argument is based on two main
assumptions: the first is that large banks set interest rates uniformly across markets (Radecki (1998))
and the second is that they have access to cheap wholesale deposits.
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large syndicated loans, and therefore is different from this study. Sapienza (2002) uses
a loan-level data set for Italian banks, and concludes that in-market mergers involving
relatively small targets result in lower interest rates charged on loans. This chapter is
similar to Sapienza (2002) in exploring the effect of mergers on loan prices by using
loan-level data, but my analysis focuses on U.S. data instead of the Italian data. The
main contributions of this study are as follows. Consistent with the hypothesis that
the after-merger decline in spreads is due to efficiencies created by mergers rather than
any change in the quality of the borrowers or in the competitiveness of the markets,
this study shows that the reduction in spreads is both statistically and economically
more significant for the subsample of mergers with larger than median after-merger
decline in their operating costs than the subsample of mergers with smaller than
median operating cost decline. Moreover, my analyses also incorporate the structure
of the targets' markets (whether they were dominated by large vs. small banks before
the merger). Lastly, unlike Sapienza (2002), this study also addresses the issue of the
endogeneity of the timing of the mergers, by using the dates of U.S. intrastate banking
deregulation as an instrument.
1.1.2 Potential Effects of Mergers on Small Business Lending
Since small businesses are less transparent, there exists a large asymmetry of in-
formation between these firms and potential lenders. However, banks can reduce a
possible credit rationing problem (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) by forming "relation-
ships" through which small businesses can find access to capital, but not always with
favorable prices (Petersen and Rajan (1994)).7 While small banks specialize in these
more soft-information-based "relationship loans" to smaller and more opaque borrow-
ers, large banks mostly make "hard" (quantitative) information-based "transaction
loans" to larger and more transparent borrowers. Some possible explanations for the
7See Boot (2000) for its literature review of the relationship lending literature and also Berger
and Udell (2002) for detailed explanations of different types of lending.
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disadvantage of large banks in relationship lending could be Williamson-type orga-
nizational diseconomies of giving both types of loans (Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan
(1999)), or the hierarchical structures of the large banks, where quantitative, easily
transferable information about potential borrowers is more valuable for the loan offi-
cer of lower rank (Stein (2002)).? However, it has also been empirically shown that
large banks, when they make small business loans, require lower interest rates and
less collateral for these loans (Berger and Udell (1996)).
All these theories imply that after the consolidation, large acquirers would signifi-
cantly drop small "relationship loans" of the smaller-sized targets. Although Strahan
and Weston (1998) find that there is no significant change in lending to small busi-
nesses, Keeton (1996), Peek and Rosengren (1996), Berger et al. (1998) and Sapienza
(2002) give evidence of a decline in the amount of small business lending after the large
bank mergers. However, in the late 1990s, improvements in information technology
and adoption of credit scoring models for small business lending could have enabled
large banks to acquire more "hard" information on small loans. Small business credit
scoring is a data processing technology about the firm and the credit history of its
owner using statistical methods, and it creates opportunities for non-transparent small
firms to borrow from large banks. 9
1.2 Data and Sample Description
1.2.1 Data
The primary data source for this chapter is the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of
Terms of Business Lending (STBL). STBL provides confidential data on the charac-
8See Udell (1989), Nakamura (1993), Berger and Udell (1995), Cole, Goldberg, and White (1999),
and Berger et al. (2005b) for more discussion and empirical evidence on differences in lending
between large and small banks.
9 See Hand and Henley (1997) for a review of the statistical methods used in credit scoring and
Berger et al. (2005a), Berger and DeYoung (2005), and DeYoung et al. (2005) for the effects of its
application in the banking industry.
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teristics of individual commercial and industrial (C&I) loan extensions of a stratified
sample of roughly 300 U.S. commercial banks and 50 branches of foreign banks. It
covers all C&I loans (new loans, takedowns under revolving credit agreements, and
renewals) of a given bank with a face value of at least $1000, disbursed within the first
business week of February, May, August, and November. To my knowledge, STBL is
the only loan-level data source covering C&I loans of different sizes and characteristics
extended by a stratified sample of U.S. commercial banks.'l
The flow nature of the data, covering new loans and renewals, is ideal for my
analysis since the effects of the merger would be reflected mostly in the new loans,
rather than the entire portfolio of existing loans. The information on loan charac-
teristics is very detailed, including the stated rate of interest, loan size, total size of
the commitment (line of credit) under which the loan was extended, maturity, fre-
quency of payments, whether the loan is secured or not, whether the loan is fixed or
floating-rate, etc. One limitation of the data is that it does not provide information
on characteristics of borrowing firms. Following the prior literature (see, for instance,
Berger et al. (1998)), my analyses will proxy for the size of the borrower by the
maximum of the size of the loan and the total amount of commitment under which
the loan was drawn.
The survey covers nearly all of the large banks in the U.S. and a sample of medium-
sized and small banks. If and when a bank decides not to report any more, another
bank with similar characteristics is chosen to replace it. The Federal Reserve System
uses the survey to measure the average cost of business borrowing in the U.S. economy.
Therefore, concerns about reporting biases and sample selection issues are alleviated
by the fact that this survey is not used for regulation purposes.
I matched the STBL to three other data sources. First, I use the quarterly Reports
1 0Loan Pricing Corporation's Deal Scan provides loan-level information as well. However, for this
chapter's purpose, Deal Scan would not be an appropriate data source since it includes only the
large, syndicated loans of the largest U.S. banks. Besides, the share of each agent-bank within the
syndication is blank in a considerable portion of the data.
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of Condition and Income (Call Reports), which provide aggregate bank-level income
statement and balance sheet data. Small business loan data are from June Call
Reports. Second, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's branch-level Summary
of Deposits data are used to determine which local banking markets are served by the
sample banks. The last data source is the National Information Center (NIC) Data
File, which provides information on the merging banks and the dates of the mergers.
1.2.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Table 1.1 documents descriptive statistics of STBL banks between 1987 and 2003.
The sum of total assets of all surveyed banks has a mean of about $2.7 trillion over
68 quarters, which corresponds, on average, to 53% of all banking assets. The median
bank in the survey has gross total assets of about $1.2 billion. However, the mean
value of gross total assets is $9.8 billion, showing that the survey is biased towards
larger banks. The net return on assets has a mean and median of 1%, while the
non-performing loans ratio is, on average, 2%. Panels B and C of the same table
describe respective descriptive characteristics of the acquirers and targets, as of one
quarter before the merger. Compared to the median bank in the sample, the median
acquirer is larger (with $6.1 billion of gross total assets) and the median target is
smaller (with about $184 million of gross total assets). Net return on assets for the
median acquirer is 8.2%, while it is 0.9% for the median target.
The merger sample of this chapter covers the period between 1990 and 2000. I
concentrate on the 1990s because of the large increase in the number of bank merg-
ers in this decade. This increase is due to the removal of intrastate and interstate
branching restrictions on banks in the 1980s and early 1990s, officially finalized by
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.l l Some
1lSee, for instance, Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise (1995), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), Berger,
Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), and Kroszner and Strahan (1999) for more information on bank-
ing deregulation, its effect on bank mergers, and exact dates for each state. See also Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) for the argument that deregulation is the dominant factor in merger
20
researchers suggest that it might take up to three years for the consolidating firms
to fully realize efficiency gains (Berger et al. (1995), Calomiris and Karceski (2000),
Focarelli and Panetta (2003)). To address this issue, loan-level observations of this
study span 68 quarters between 1987 and 2003, which include a three-year period
before the first and after the last merger in my sample. STBL covers in total about
2.2 million bank-loan-quarter observations for this time period.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics of the loan-level observations. The mean
face value of all loans is $727,143 while the mean value of the total commitment
amount is about $5.3 million. Average spread (effective annual interest rate, net of
the treasury rate of the same duration as the loan) is 4.25%, but it declines to 2.75%
when only large loans are considered. Weighted by the loan size (which is equal to
the total commitment amount if the loan is drawn under commitment and to the face
value of the loan otherwise), 82% of all loans is under commitment, and this ratio
increases to 96% for large loans of size above $25 million. On average, 73% of the
value of all loans is secured by some type of collateral while 75% is floating-rate.
In this study, I call any consolidation of two non-failing commercial banks a
"merger" if the charter of the target disappears and only the acquirer survives.12
After the banking deregulation, one common type of merger is the consolidation of
several branches of, in fact, the same bank, which had to operate in different states
with separate charters because of the branching restrictions of the time period. These
"within family" mergers are excluded from my "merger" sample. Between 1990 and
2000, there were 2,274 commercial bank "mergers" in the U.S. For my empirical
analyses, more than one merger of a given acquirer within the same quarter is used as
a single data-point. This reduces the number of mergers to 1,857 "merger-quarters,"
defined as quarters in which the acquirer merges with at least one target. STBL
and acquisition activity after the 1980s.
12 This chapter analyzes commercial banks rather than bank holding companies (BHCs) mainly
because decisions on the characteristics of loans are mostly made at the bank level rather than the
BHC level.
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covers 263 of these "merger-quarters," corresponding to 350 mergers by 121 banks.1 3
Since the survey includes nearly all of the large banks, these 263 merger-quarters
represent a very significant portion of the mergers in the U.S.: 62% of all acquirers'
assets and 51% of all targets' assets.
1.3 Dynamic Effect of Mergers on Loan Prices
This section will introduce the methodology of the study and show the basic results.
It will explore how the interest rates charged on the C&I loan flow of an acquirer
change after the merger, after controlling for the size and other characteristics of
these loans.
1.3.1 Basic Test and Variable Definitions
To analyze the effect of mergers on loan prices, I estimate the following before-after
regression in the event time with a six year window around the merger:
Spread,k,t = a + /l AftrMrgrOnekt + 32AftrMrgrTwok, t + 3AftrMrgrThreekt
+- 4 LoanSizei,k,t -+ sMrgrSizek,t + 1Xi,k,t -+ A2Yk,t-1 + dt + fk + Ei,k,t
The dependent variable, Spread, is the effective annual interest rate, which is the
ratio of the realized yield from compound interest for one year to the amount of the
loan, on loan of bank in quarter minus the Treasury rate of equal duration as the
loan.l4 For the fixed-rate loans, the Treasury rate of equal duration as the loan is
13 Small acquirers, which have gross total assets of less than $100 million, were deleted from the
sample since they both had very short time series with many gaps, and loans that they reported per
quarter were very small in number (only 1 in some quarters) and noisy. Only 0.7% of all STBL loan-
level observations and 4 merger-quarters are lost in this way; and including these observations both
statistically and economically does not alter the loan-level coefficients reported, but could distort
the bank-level regression results.
14The data do not include fees charged on loans, but this could only bias my results if fees depend
on certain characteristics of the borrowers, and if this dependence changes after the merger, which
is very unlikely. Generally, large banks have certain policies on fee structure based on the size of the
loan, and these policies do not systematically vary by borrower characteristics.
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subtracted from the effective interest rate. For floating-rate loans, the appropriate
duration is the next re-pricing interval, but the data for this variable are only available
after 1997. However, for most of the floating-rate loans reported after 1997, the
expected re-pricing interval is up to a month. Therefore, in order to normalize the
spreads for the floating-rate loans, I used either the one-month Treasury rate or (if the
maturity is less than a month) the Treasury rate corresponding to the maturity of the
loan. Alternative methods of calculating the spread are also checked, such as using a
one-day rate instead of the one-month rate to normalize floating-rate loans or using
prime rate instead of the Treasury rates in calculating spreads. As another robustness
check, Treasury rates are also replaced by LIBOR (London Inter Bank Offer Rate)
and swap rates of equal duration since those rates could reflect the funding costs of
the banks better than the Treasury rates, especially in the later periods of the data.1 5
The average spread per quarter for all the banks in the data other than the acquiring
banks was also checked to be included as a control. The results are both economically
and statistically unchanged.
I use three after-merger dummy variables which span three years before and after
the merger. AftrMrgrOne, AftrMrgrTwo, and AftrMrgrThree are dummy variables
equal to zero for twelve quarters before and after the merger, except that AftrMrgrOne
is equal to one for the first four quarters after the merger, AftrMrgrTwo is equal to
one for the fifth to eighth quarters after the merger, and AftrMrgrThree is equal to
one for the ninth to twelfth quarters after the merger.
Each regression includes LoanSize, the natural logarithm of the size of the loan.
Since the data set does not provide information on the firm characteristics of the
borrowers, regressions will use loan size as a proxy for the size of the borrowing firms.
15 Treasury data used are one-, three-, six-month constant maturity Treasury bill rates, and one-,
two-, three-, five-, seven-, ten-, twenty-year Treasury notes. The rates for maturities other than
these are calculated by simple interpolation and extrapolation. One-, three-, and six-month LIBOR
(London Inter Bank Offer Rate), in addition to one-, two-, three-, five-, seven-, ten-, and twenty-year
swap rates, are used as for the robustness check.
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Loan size is equal to the total commitment (line of credit) amount if the loan is drawn
under commitment and to the face amount of the loan otherwise. That is because
total commitment amount better proxies the size of the borrower than the face value
of the loan. Loan size is, in fact, endogenous since it could potentially be affected
by mergers, and one might actually think that including loan size over-controls for
changes due to the merger. MrgrSize is equal to the natural logarithm of the total
size of the target as of one quarter before the merger and is used to control for the
size of the merger. For merger-quarters in which an acquirer merges with more than
one target, merger size corresponds to the sum of the gross total assets of all these
targets.
In addition to these main variables, regressions include some market-related as
well as firm- and loan-specific controls. Note that the basic tests include only the
level of the merger size and the market-related variables as controls instead of their
interactions with the after-merger dummy variables. That is because following sec-
tions of the chapter will include extensive analyses of these interactions. StateDummy
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target and the acquirer were in the same state
before the merger. This variable is included because, as already explained, elimination
of intrastate restrictions was the most important reason for the increasing number of
mergers in the 1990s.16 MrktHHI is the natural logarithm of the average Hirfindahl-
Hirschman Index of the markets which the acquirer serves.17 I also included a set of
loan characteristics (Xi,k,t) in addition to the loan size to control for their additional
effect on interest rates. But, due to the endogeneity of these characteristics, including
them in the regressions might also over-control for changes after the merger. These
16All merger-quarters, which have both in-state and out-of state mergers of a given acquirer in
a given quarter, are dropped; however, these types of merger-quarters were very few in number. I
also checked to include a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state in which the acquirer operates was
deregulated or not (both for intra and inter-state deregulation). The results were not altered.
1 7The Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated as the sum of the squares of the deposit market
shares of all banks in a given market. It is based on deposits rather than loans, because there is no
market-level data for bank loans.
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characteristics include DummyCommit, which is equal to one if the loan is drawn
under a formal or informal commitment, and zero otherwise. DummyFixed is equal
to one if the loan is a fixed-rate loan, and is equal to zero if it is a floating-rate
loan. DummySecured is equal to one if the loan is secured by collateral of any kind,
and zero otherwise. Moreover, each regression includes a set of bank-specific controls
measured as of t-l, Yk,t_1. These controls include the natural logarithm of the gross
total assets of the acquirer (AcquirerSize) and its nonperforming loans ratio (Nonper-
formRatio), which is calculated as the sum of loans over 90 days late and loans not
accruing over total loans. Each regression includes bank fixed-effects (fk) in order to
use the bank before the merger as a control for itself after the merger. Moreover, I
account for serial correlation by allowing for clustering of the error term at the bank
level. Lastly, dt corresponds to the 67 quarter dummies.
1.3.2 Main Results
Table 1.3 reports results of the basic regressions for the whole sample of loans and all
types of mergers.18 The first column shows the very basic regression results, including
only the lagged size of the acquirer in addition to three after-merger dummies, and
the second column adds the loan size, which proxies the size of the borrower. The
favorable effect on loan prices starts within the first year after the merger, but becomes
statistically much more significant in the second year. The coefficient on AftrMrgrOne
is equal to -7 basis points, and adding other controls does not alter this result except
that in the regressions including StateDummy it decreases to only -6 basis points. The
second-year dummy has a coefficient of -11 basis points without controlling the loan
size and -7 basis points when we control for the loan size, and is always statistically
18The differences in the total number of observations between columns are due to lack of data
for a few observations of some variables. For instance, for a couple of the targets, gross total assets
corresponding to specific dates could not be found. Besides, as explained before, the total number
of observations declined by a few observations in regressions including StateDummy because of some
dropped merger-quarters.
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significant at the 1% level. As expected, LoanSize, which proxies the size of the
borrower, has the expected negative and statistically significant coefficient.
Regressions in columns three and four include the total assets of the target, which
is the proxy for the size of the merger (MrgrSize), and the results are unaltered.
Besides, after the merger, gross total assets of the acquirer already include the size
of the target; therefore, when MrgrSize is used in addition to the size of the acquirer
(AcquirerSize'), its marginal effect as a control is insignificant. In the rest of the
chapter the regressions will only include the size of the acquirer before and after the
merger.19 The significant reduction in spreads is robust to including StateDummy
and MrktHHI as well.
The coefficients in front of the dummies reflecting different characteristics of the
loans are consistent with the existing empirical literature. Loans secured by collateral
of any kind have higher spreads than unsecured loans (Berger and Udell (1990)),
while floating-rate loans have higher spreads than the fixed-rate loans. Loans under
commitment have lower spreads compared to loans not under commitment.20
Although Focarelli and Panetta (2003) mention about three years of gestation
period for efficiency gains to be fully realized, my analysis shows that the average
decline in the spreads starts within the first year after the merger and has its peak
between the fifth and eighth quarters after the merger. When the first year effect
is decomposed into quarters, regressions using quarter by quarter after merger dum-
mies demonstrate that significant negative change is coming in the third and fourth
quarters. Similarly, Sapienza (2002) finds that, in Italy, the efficiency gains create
favorable loan prices about six months after the mergers. 21
19However, I will always check whether or not including target size in addition to the acquirer size
alters the results
20 Since DummyCommit is highly correlated with SizeLoan, I excluded loan size from the regression
including the commitment dummy. The significantly negative coefficient of DummyCommit is also
robust to including the natural logarithm of the face value of each loan as a control.
2 1Although unlikely, the significance of the t-statistics in the loan-level regressions might be a
consequence of the large cross-sectional variation could have blown up t-statistics, even though
standard errors in all regressions are corrected for clustering of observations at the bank level.
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1.3.3 Main Results with "After-Last-Merger" Dummies
Surveyed banks include many large acquirers, which may have many mergers within a
short time. In my sample, 39 of the 263 merger-quarters are the second merger quarter
in a row, and 98 are merger-quarters of the same bank which had at least one merger
within the past year. As a consequence, after-merger dummies could often overlap
in taking the value of one within their corresponding years after the merger. This
possibility might reduce the variation in my sample and bias the economic significance
of my estimates downwards. In addition, one might believe that the last merger in a
succession of mergers might have the biggest effect. In order to be able to compare
the economic significance of coefficients, I created a set of new "After-Last-Merger
Dummies," by modifying the variables AftrMrgrOne - AftrMrgrThree such that,
in a given quarter, the corresponding year's after-merger dummy is switched on for
only the very last merger, ignoring all the other mergers even if they occurred within
the last three years. For instance, AftrMrgrTwo is equal to 1 in the fifth to eighth
quarters after the merger only if those 's do not coincide with the first four quarters
of another merger of the same bank; and AftrMrgrThree is equal to 1 in the ninth
to twelfth quarters after the merger only if those 's do not coincide with the first
eight quarters of another merger of the same bank. The first two columns of Table
1.4 compare the coefficients of the new "After-Last-Merger Dummies" to the ones
of the original after-merger dummies. The difference in the economic significance of
the coefficients is noticeable. The average decline in spread within both the first and
second years after the merger is 12 basis points if after-last-merger dummies are used,
while the same decline is only 7 basis points if the original overlapping after-merger
dummies are used.
In order to address this concern, the same set of regressions was run by using bank-quarter-level
observations as well. For that purpose, the mean of the interest rates charged on loans as well as their
sizes at the bank-quarter level were used, after collapsing the loan-level data by bank, quarter, and
some characteristics of these loans. The results were both economically and statistically unaltered.
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1.3.4 Results for Subsamples Based on Merger Size
In addition to using only the last merger in a series for a given acquirer, this sec-
tion explores the larger- or smaller-than-median mergers of the same acquirer by
using the median target size (MrgrSize, as already defined) of each acquirer over the
sample period. The last two columns of Table 1.4 show the results of the regres-
sions using the following two subsamples: "Larger-than-Median Mergers" and
"Smaller-than Median Mergers" of a given acquirer. The number of observations
declines by at least 110,000, meaning that concentrating only on the larger- or the
smaller-than-median mergers of the same acquirer does not eliminate mergers totally
from in between the successive mergers. After the larger-than-median mergers of a
given acquirer, the decline in spreads is statistically significant only within the second
year after the merger. However, smaller-than-median mergers result in reductions in
spreads starting within the first year, and this decline is also statistically significant
within the second and third years after the merger. By using "After-Merger Dum-
mies" ("After-Last-Merger Dummies"), my analysis shows that smaller-than-median
mergers of a given acquirer result in a decline of, on average, 8 (11), 8 (12), and 8
(12) basis points on C&I loan spreads within, respectively, the first, second, and third
years after the merger.
1.3.5 Results for Subsamples Based on Loan Size
Estimation using a whole sample of loans is less than ideal; a very large loan drawn
under a large commitment should be analyzed separately from a very small loan of
face-value or commitment size less than $100,000. This is true because loan size prox-
ies for the borrowing-firm size, and commitments to really big companies should be
differentiated from loans to small businesses since they are made based on different
lending technologies (see section 2.1 for the theories of different lending technologies).
Moreover, given that acquirers generally buy targets of much smaller sizes, new ad-
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ditions to the acquirer's loan portfolio would most likely be the smaller loans of the
target or the potential new customers of smaller firms in targets' markets. Further-
more, as observed above, the spreads on large commitments to the existing borrowers
of the acquirer are already much lower than on smaller sized loans. Therefore, any
gains due to diversification, scale, or scope economies are expected to be reflected
more with smaller borrowers.
Table 1.5 presents results for subsamples based on the loan size, which is equal
to the total commitment amount if the loan is drawn under commitment, and to the
face value of the loan, if otherwise.2 2 Spreads on small loans with size less than $1
million decrease, on average, by 15 basis points (b.p.) within the first year, and 14
b.p. within the second year after the merger. If "After-Last-Merger Dummies" are
used instead of the original overlapping after-merger dummies as the right-hand-side
(RHS) variables, the first and second year declines in the spreads become 23 and 20
b.p., respectively. All these coefficients are significant at the 1% level. On the other
hand, the change in the spreads on large loans (of size larger than $1 million) is not
statistically different from zero. The largest decline in spreads within the first and
second years after the merger, using "After-Merger Dummies" ("After-Last-Merger
Dummies"'), is for the smallest borrowers. It amounts to 23 and 16 (30 and 23) basis
points for loans of size less than $100,000, and 21 and 16 (28 and 23) basis points for
loans of size less than $250,000. All coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
The rest of the chapter will report the results of the regressions using "After-
Merger-Dummies," even though they have economically less significant coefficients
than "After-Last-Merger Dummies," except for times when both are reported. That
is because "After-Last-Merger Dummies" concentrate on only the last merger in a
succession of mergers while "After-Merger-Dummies" include all of the mergers of an
2 2 Existing literature generally defines LoanSize of less than $1 million as the small loans; however,
some papers use $250,000 or $100,000 as the cut-off dollar amounts for small loans. Therefore,
regression results for different subsamples of small loans will be reported.
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acquirer.
1.3.6 Results for Subsamples Based on Other Loan Characteristics
Table 1.6 shows the results of the regressions for two different subsamples based on
loan characteristics. 2 3 In Panel A, our original set of regressions were run first includ-
ing only the loans drawn under commitment ("Loans under Commitment") and
then for loans that are not under commitment ("Loans not under Commitment").
Although loans not under commitment are much fewer in number compared to the
loans under commitment, the decline in their spreads is both economically and statis-
tically more significant. This is probably because nearly all of the non-commitment
loans are small loans, of loan size less than $1 million, and mostly less than $250,000.
However, the difference in the statistical significance of the two subsamples for the
first year could be a data issue; for the loans under commitment, the initiation dates
of the commitments were not recorded for the time period used by the analysis. How-
ever, most of the loan commitments are up to a year. Therefore, the lack of initiation
date for the commitment is not a problem for the second year after the merger.
Panel B includes the same set of regressions for subsamples based on whether the
loan is secured or not ("Loans Secured by Collateral" vs. "Loans not Secured
by Collateral"). Panel B shows that secured loans are driving the main results,
perhaps because unsecured loans are generally larger in size, and fewer in number.
When the unsecured loans are excluded from the sample, the decline in spreads within
the third year after the merger is statistically significant and equal to 11 and 10 basis
points for the all-loans sample and small loans, respectively.
23 Same subsample analyses were also made based on some other characteristics of loans, such as
whether the loan is a fixed vs. floating-rate loan, demand vs. non-demand loan, etc. The results
are not reported because there was no interesting difference between these subsamples.
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1.3.7 Potential Changes in Loan Portfolios after the Mergers
One alternative explanation for the main results presented in section 3.2. is a possible
change in the riskiness of the acquirer's loan portfolio after the merger. Since STBL
data do not link loans and the firm characteristics of the borrowers, it is not possible
to control for possible changes in the characteristics of the loan portfolios after the
merger, nor can we track existing borrowers of the acquirer after the merger. In terms
of control, loan or commitment size is used as a proxy for the borrower size in all the
regressions. Additionally, since targets are, on average, much smaller and riskier than
their acquirers, the additions to the acquirer's portfolio after the merger are expected
to be relatively smaller and riskier borrowers; hence, if kept in the portfolio, they are
expected to increase the riskiness rather than decrease it.
However, using aggregate data, we can check whether there was any risk-shifting
in the loan portfolios of the acquirer after the merger. Changes in the nonperforming
loans ratio are used as a proxy for changes in the riskiness of the portfolio. If the
alternative explanation were correct, one would expect the nonperforming loans ratio
of the acquirer to decline after the merger. Following prior literature, the nonper-
forming loans ratio is calculated as the ratio of loans more than 90 days late, plus
loans not accruing, to the total loans. The results of regressing nonperforming loans
ratio on the three-year-after-merger dummies show that there is no statistically sig-
nificant change in the nonperforming loans ratio of the acquirer after the merger,
when compared to the same ratio before the merger. (The results are not reported
since the coefficients for all three years after the merger were both economically and
statistically not different from zero.) A possible longer-run change is checked by using
five-year-after-merger dummies, as well and the conclusions remain unaltered.
The literature emphasizes that loan characteristics could also affect the inter-
est rates charged on loans. (See, for instance, Berger and Udell (1990), arguing
that collateral is most often associated with higher-risk loans, and consequently with
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higher interest rates.) To check this possibility, loan-level data was used to determine
whether or not the volume of certain types of loans within the acquirer's portfolio
changed after the merger. Table 1.7 presents the results for ratios based on three
main characteristics within the portfolio of all loans as well as the subsample of small
loans.24 The main results of this chapter could be similar if, given loan size, the vol-
ume of secured loans, or fixed-rate loans, or loans under commitment were to increase
in banks' portfolios after the merger. (See the signs of the coefficients of these loan
characteristics in Table 1.3.) The dependent variable in Panel A is the ratio of secured
loans in banks' portfolios, which is the total volume of loans secured by any type of
collateral over the total loans of a given bank in a given quarter. The only significant
result is the positive coefficient in front of the first-year after-merger dummy. As
shown in Table 1.3, loans secured by collateral are more risky, and consequently have
higher spreads given their size; therefore this positive coefficient would not drive the
results. On the contrary, it would bias first-year results in the opposite direction.2 5
Panels B and C present the results of the similar analyses for changes in the volume
of loans under commitment and the volume of floating-rate loans within the acquirer's
portfolio after the merger. No coefficient of interest turned out to be significant in
Panel B. The significantly positive first-year coefficient in Panel C (following the same
line of thought as for ratio of secured-loans) was interpreted as evidence that would
in fact bias first-year coefficients of the main regressions in the opposite direction.
Although only one subsample of small loans is reported, changes in all these ratios
were analyzed within the subsample of large loans in addition to different subsamples
of small loans, along with changes in the natural logarithm of the face value or loan
2 4Table 1.7 presents only the results based on three main characteristics of loans. Changes in
ratios based on different sizes and duration of loans were also checked, but not reported to save
space. Moreover, all the regressions were run by excluding very short-term or very long-term loans
as well as excluding demand loans with no stated maturity. All the results are robust to these checks.
2 5As a side point, it should be noted that ratio of secured loans increases in the portfolio of new
loan extensions within the first year after the merger. A possible explanation could be that, on
average, more collateral is asked for in the restructuring phase after the merger because the acquirer
might have some information disadvantage regarding the potential customers of the target.
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size within different size categories post merger. The regression analyses show no
significant change within the first two years. Changes in the number of certain types
of loans in addition to the volume of them within the portfolio were also analyzed.
All these robustness checks support that the reduction in the spread is not driven by
changes in the types of loans that the banks make.
1.4 Market Overlap and Target's Market Structure
The following two sections will differentiate types of mergers, based on the geograph-
ical market overlap between the acquirer and the target as well as the structure of
the target's markets.
1.4.1 In-Market vs. Out-of-Market Mergers
In-market mergers are defined as mergers of two banks which were serving at least
one common banking market before the merger. Out-of-market mergers, on the other
hand, are market-extension mergers, where target and acquirer did not have any
market overlap. In-market mergers produce much more potential for both exercising
market power and creating efficiency gains. First, compared to a merger of no market
overlap, the concentration of the after-merger banking market, hence the market
power of the acquirer is more likely to increase. Second, the consolidated bank would
have more offices to consolidate, more overlapping operations from which to choose
the most efficient, more common local expertise to share, and consequently more
synergy to create.26
26See DeLong (1998) showing that mergers that increase geographical focus increase value. Hous-
ton and Ryngaert (1997) and Houston et al. (2001) also show that stock returns to the combined
bank are positively correlated with the geographical overlap between the acquirer and the target
while Kane (2000) show that gains of the shareholders of the large acquirers are larger after the
in-state mergers. Moreover, Penas and Unal (2004), analyzing the commercial bank mergers be-
tween 1991 and 1998, find that, for an identical increase in size, gains to the bondholders of both
the acquirer and the target around the merger announcement are higher if the merger is an in-state
merger.
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For the out-of-market acquirers, the potential for efficiency gains through con-
solidating operations or closing the least efficient of overlapping branches does not
exist. However, the consolidated bank could enjoy other types of cost efficiencies,
such as scale economies. Moreover, acquirers might have a very different strategy
after out-of-market mergers: in the new markets they enter, they may try to create
competition and gain more market share by offering lower rates than the target and
the rival banks used to offer before the merger.
Separating in-market mergers and market-extension mergers in the U.S. is a rel-
atively difficult task since most of the banks, especially the larger ones, operate in
many markets. As a consequence, the target and the acquirer can overlap in some
markets while not overlapping in others. Since branch-level loan data are not avail-
able for U.S. commercial banks, FDIC's Summary of Deposit data was used to get
information on the deposit shares of banks instead of loan shares in each market.
Using deposits data implicitly assumes that banks generally make loans in the same
markets where they collect deposits. This is not an unreasonable assumption since
existing empirical evidence shows that banking markets have been highly localized.
(See Petersen and Rajan (2002) for small business loan markets.) In the U.S., a
banking market is defined in antitrust analysis as the Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) or non-MSA rural county. The market overlap between the acquirer and the
target was defined by the following formula:27
E min(DepositsAcq, DepositSTrgt)
MrktOverlap = n
Z(DepositsAq + DepositsTrgt)
n
where DepositsAq and DepositsTrgt are, respectively, total deposits of the acquirer and
the target in n markets, in which either acquirer or target operate. MrktOverlap_ Trgt
27A very similar formula using number of branches instead of the total number of deposits is
used in Houston and Ryngaert (1997) and Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) to identify market
overlap.
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is constructed by replacing the denominator of the above ratio by the total deposits of
the target. Below are the summary statistics of these variables:28
Mean Median Min Lower 25th Upper 25th Max N
MrktOverlap 0.044 0.013 0 0 0.056 0.458 336
MrktOverlap Trgt 0.554 0.769 0 0 1 1 336
In 33% of all mergers, target and acquirer have zero market overlap, and in about 71%
of all mergers they overlap less than the mean overlap of 0.044. Descriptive statistics
show that the majority of the mergers in my sample are in-market mergers with some,
but not full, market overlap, which potentially could explain the average negative
change in loan spreads after the mergers in my sample.
In order to analyze how the effect of mergers on loan prices changes as the market
overlap between acquirer and target varies, the merger sample was put into categories
based on the market overlap. The first group consists of merger-quarters in which the
acquirer and the target have zero market overlap before the merger. These are pure
market-extension mergers and are called "Out-of-Market Mergers" in this paper. The
remaining mergers, which have at least one overlapping market before the merger, are
in-market mergers. The subgroup of in-market mergers, for which MrktOverlap is in the
upper 25th percentile and MrktOverlap_Trgt is larger than or equal to its mean value, is
labeled "In-Market Mergers with Large Market-Overlap."2 9 The remaining
28 Summary statistics are calculated by using all of the mergers, not the merger-quarters. The total number
of mergers decreased by 14 since branch-level deposit data for some of the targets was missing for the
relevant year.
29 Since the upper 25th percentile value of the MrktOverlapTrgt is still equal to 1 (full overlap), the only
possible cutoff points are median and mean of the ratio. The following analysis constrains In-Market
Mergers with Large Overlap to have MrktOverlap_Trgt to be larger than the mean value, but restricting
them to be larger than the median value, or MrktOverlap to be larger than its mean value, does not alter
the conclusions.
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in-market mergers are called "In-Market Mergers with Small Market-Overlap."
Notice that if the acquirer has even a single branch in one of the target's markets, which
is generally the case in the mergers of mega-acquirers of the late 1990s, the
consolidation is treated as an in-market merger with small market-overlap.
In order to differentiate mergers with large market overlap, two important
restrictions were applied. First, the market overlap between them was restricted to be a
significant portion of the total deposits of both banks so that in the markets where they
overlap they form bigger banks. Second, this overlap should be a very significant
fraction of the total deposits of the targets. When a given acquirer made many mergers
within the same quarter, some of their mergers could be in-market while the others
could be out-of-market. I exclude from each subsample all merger-quarters that have
different types of mergers; however, these merger-quarters were only 12 in number.
The mergers within a given quarter by the same acquirer were mostly either
completely in-market or completely out-of-market. But an acquirer could have different
types of mergers following each other in a short time. In order to have a clean test of the
effects of the different types of mergers, an in-market merger (out-of-market merger) of
a given acquirer was included only if it was not less three years after its out-of-market
(in-market merger). The final sample consists of 42 "Out-of Market," 84 "In-Market
with Small Market-Overlap," and 50 "In-Market with Large Market-Overlap" merger-
quarters. The possible effects of out-of-market mergers and in-market mergers and the
net predicted effect on loan spreads are summarized below.
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Out-of-Market In-Market Mergers In-Market Mergers
Mergers with Small Overlap with Large Overlap
Costs - Costs Costs $ 4-
No Concerns Few Concerns Could Create Concerns
for Market Power for Market Power for Market Power
Decline in Spreads Larger Decline in Spreads Change in Spreads
is Expected is Expected is Uncertain
Table 1.8 analyzes different subsamples of mergers based on the geographical
market overlap. Panel A shows the results of the basic regressions (with "After-Merger
Dummies") for the "Out-of-Market" subsample. Consistent with the hypotheses, for the
mergers where there is zero market overlap, the statistically significant average decline
in the spreads is only 7 basis points for small loans within the first year after the merger.
In other words, the results both statistically and economically become less significant
when only the mergers with zero overlap between acquirer and target markets are
considered.
Panel B presents the results of basic regressions for the "In-Market Mergers with
Small Market-Overlap." For these types of mergers, there is much more potential for
cost declines and not much concern for increase in market power. As presented in the
table, the decline in the loan spreads within the first and second year after the merger
increase to, respectively, 15 and 15 basis points for all loans and 20 and 19 basis points
for small loans.30 These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level, and they
are also statistically different from the ones in Panel A. Compared to the market-
extension mergers, the reduction in spreads is, as expected, much larger.
30 Regressions using "After-Last-Merger Dummies" give coefficients that are economically much larger.
See Appendix Table for the results.
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The last panel of Table 1.8 reports results of the subsample of "In-Market Mergers
with Large Market-Overlap." As explained above, this subsample could include some
mergers that; have so much overlap as to create some concerns for market power;
however, at the same time they enjoy much more potential for efficiency gains. First-
, second-, and third-year-after-merger coefficients are, respectively, -5, -4, and -8 basis
points for all loans, and -11, -12, and -19 basis points for small loans. The decline
in spreads within all three years after the merger is statistically significant at the 5%
level for small loans. That means the market power effect is, on average, outweighed
by the higher potential for efficiency gains. To check if the upper 25th percentile
cut-off (which is 0.056) for significant overlap is high enough to include only the
mergers with such significant overlap as to create concerns for market power, Table
1.9 Panel A shows the same regression results using the subsample of mergers where
MrktOverlap is in the upper 10th percentile. These mergers, which have much more
potential to increase the concentration of banking markets, result, on average, in 13
and 20 basis points higher spreads within the first and third years after the merger,
and this statistically significant increase is driven by larger loans.3 1
1.4.2 The Effect of the Target's Market Structure
This section will explore the effect of the target's market structure on some strategic
decisions of the acquirer to reduce or increase the loan rates after the merger. As
Sapienza (2002) states, "If a bank's motivation is to gain market share, then it can
bring new, aggressive competition to markets that were imperfectly competitive, and
it can reduce the possibility of collusive behavior." However, if a large acquirer is
entering into a market dominated by small banks, there would be no need to reduce
31 Mergers having significant effects on market structure were also identified by calculating the
pro forma change in the Hirfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) as described in the literature (see, for
instance, Hannan and Prager (1998)). In my sample, there were only 9 mergers that produced a
pro-forma increase in target-market HHI of at least 200 points to a post-merger pro forma HHI of at
least 1800. Regression analysis using these mergers also results in a statistically significant increase
in spreads after the merger.
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spreads to gain market share since a big acquirer would already be more efficient and
therefore charging lower prices on a given loan than the prices of the existing smaller
competitors. 2
Since STBL is biased towards larger banks, most of the acquirers in the sample
are large banks, although the size of the targets can vary widely. For all the target
markets, using branch-level Summary of Deposits data as of two quarters before the
merger, the percentage of deposits held by different sizes of banks is calculated (as
in Berger et al. (2001)). "Small Banks' Markets" are defined as markets in which
market shares of small and medium-sized banks (with gross total assets less than $1
billion) are greater than their median market share (0.35) among all the markets of
the targets in my sample. "Large Banks' Markets" are markets dominated by
banks with gross assets more than $1 billion.
Table 1.10 presents the results for two subsamples of "Out-of-Market" mergers:
mergers into "Small Banks' Market" and into "Large Banks' Market." As shown in
Panel A, when out-of-market acquirers enter new markets where there was already
large bank dominance, they reduce spreads starting within the first year. This signif-
icant reduction within the first year is, on average, 14 basis points for all loans and 19
basis points for large loans. Panel B shows the results for market-extension mergers
into Small Banks' Market, where there is no significant change in the spreads after
the mergers.3 3
Second, the effect of the target's market structure on the decision to exercise
market power is explored. In Panel B of Table 1.9, results for the "In-Market Mergers
with Large Overlap" (with overlap in the upper 25th percentile), but only for the
32 It is empirically shown that large banks charge lower interest rates even for their small business
loans (Berger and Udell (1996)).
33A similar analysis was made for in-market mergers with small overlap. The significant decline
in spreads of small loans within the first two years after the merger is statistically very significant
for these in-market mergers, independent of the target's market structure. However, for large loans
the change in spreads after these in-market mergers becomes statistically significant within the first
year after the merger when the target's market was dominated by large banks rather than small
banks. This result might be interpreted as a strategic price cut, as well.
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"Small Banks' Markets," are presented. Unlike the whole sample of in-market mergers
with large (in the upper 25th percentile) overlap, which was presented in Panel C of
Table 1.8, the market power effect dominates the efficiency effect if the target markets
are dominated by small banks. Spreads on all loans increase significantly, by 10 basis
points, and on large loans by 17 basis points within the first year following the merger;
these results might be due to the lack of other large banks' competition in the target's
markets. The existence of smaller banks rather than big ones could make collusion
among banks easier and enable a newly formed consolidated bank to increase spreads.
However, it is worth noting that this regression uses only 19 merger-quarters, which
constitutes a small fraction of the merger sample.34
1.4.3 Potential Changes in Loan Portfolios after In-Market and Out-of-
Market Mergers
Robustness checks for changes in the riskiness of loan portfolios by using the nonper-
forming loans ratio as a left-hand-side (LHS) variable as well as robustness checks for
changes in ratios of loans with certain characteristics within acquirer's portfolio (as
explained in Section 3.4) are done by using only in-market mergers and out-of-market
mergers. The same checks are done for the subsample of mergers based on market
structure. Although results are not reported (to save space), the conclusions of this
section are unaltered; on the contrary, they are strengthened.
1.4.4 Within-Family Mergers
After the banking deregulation, one common type of merger is the consolidation of
the same banks' branches, which served in different states as separate banks because
of the branching restrictions of the period. These "within-family" mergers - were
34 As a caveat, there could be some endogeneity issues regarding the type of the merger and the
structure of the targets' banking markets, and the results could be due to correlation instead of
causation. For example, there could be unobservable variables that affect the type of the merger or
the structure of the targets' markets and the decline in spreads contemporaneously.
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separated out - are all out-of-market mergers. Given that these two banks (in fact,
branches) are expected to share the lending decisions of the same bank in different
states before the merger, we do not expect to see any change in their lending behav-
iors after the merger. This sample of "within-family" mergers is analyzed but not
reported in order to save space. The coefficients of all three after-merger dummies
are statistically not different from zero for basic regressions including all of the loans
and different subsamples of small business loans.
1.5 Is the Reduction in Spreads Due to Efficiency Gains?
Findings based on the market overlap between the acquirer and the target are con-
sistent with what theories imply about the magnitude of the possible efficiency and
market power effects; therefore, the decline in the spreads can be attributed to some
efficiency gains passed on to the borrowers. However, one alternative explanation for
the results might be that complexities after the mergers deteriorate the quality of
the banks' services and the banks cut prices not to loose their borrowers. Hence, the
robustness checks below aim to further test the hypothesis that the decline in the
spreads is due to efficiency gains reflected in loan rates and these reflections are not
temporary.
1.5.1 Cost Efficiencies
As in Focaralli and Panetta (2003), operating-cost ratios for the merging banks
were analyzed to further test the hypothesis that the decline in the spreads is due
to efficiency gains reflected in loan rates. For that purpose, the operating-cost ratios
(operating expense over operating income) of the acquirers as of the second year-end
after the merger were compared to the operating-cost ratios of the pro-forma banks
(targets plus acquirers) as of the year-end before the merger.3 5 Although analyzing
35As a robustness check, operating cost ratio was calculated by using total assets instead of the
operating income in the denominator. Conclusions were unaltered.
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changes in the operating-cost ratio after the merger is not an ideal to measurement
of efficiency gains, one would expect acquirers with a larger decline in operating-
cost ratios to reduce spreads more than the acquirers with less decline or even an
increase in these cost ratios. Table 1.11 presents the results based on the subsample of
mergers, after which "Operating Cost Ratio Declined More than Median" and
"Operating Cost Ratio Declined Less than Median" decline in operating cost
ratios among: all the sample mergers.3 6 The decline in spreads is both economically
and statistically much larger for the subsample with larger than median decline in
the operating cost ratios; and the difference between subsamples is highly significant.
The only significant reduction in spreads is observed within the second year after
the mergers, resulting in less than median decline in costs, and it is -8 basis points
(significant at the 5% level). However, mergers that create more than median cost
cuts result in significant decline of 22 and 18 basis points (significant at the 1% level)
for small loans within, respectively, the first and second year after the merger as well
as 17, 16 (significant at the 1% level), and 11 (significant at the 10% level) basis
points for all loans within, respectively, first, second, and third year after the merger.
More importantly, if the cost cut is higher, the effects of efficiencies are reflected in
large loans as well. Acquirers that enjoy larger than median decline in their operating
costs reduce spreads by 14, 19 (significant at the 1% level), and 22 (significant at the
5% level) basis points within, respectively, the first, second, and third year after their
mergers.
A second check was constructed based on the following result. Penas and
Unal (2004) show that bondholders of merging banks realize the highest returns if
the merging banks become "too-big-to-fail" as the result of the merger while already
36In order to have a clean test of the effects of these different types of mergers, in Table X, I
included the mergers that create larger than median decline in cost-ratios only if this merger is
not within three years after another merger of the same acquirer that created smaller than median
decline in the cost ratio. The same criterion is used for the latter subsample as well. I ended up
with 85 mergers, after which operating cost ratios declined "more than the median" and 81 "less
than the median."
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"mega" banks earn relatively lower adjusted returns. There were only 6 acquirers
which became mega acquirers (with gross total assets larger than $10 billion) after
the mergers; however it is worth noting that the decline in the spreads after the
mergers of these banks are on average much larger than after other subsamples of
mergers. Large acquirers which become mega acquirers through the mergers reduce
spreads on small loans, on average, 42 basis points within the second year and 50
basis points within the third year after the merger. Both of these coefficients are
statistically significant at the 1% level.
It is also worth mentioning that the economical significance of the decline in
spreads could have been understated since the data do not differentiate loans going
to the target's markets from all other markets of the given acquirer after the merger.
Although the technological improvements of the last decade prevent large banks from
price discrimination in different banking markets, one would expect the effect on the
spreads to be much larger for the targets' markets than for any other banking market
of the acquirer. The fact that the average after-merger decline in spreads is both
statistically and economically significant without differentiating banking markets of
the acquirer is also supporting the efficiency arguments.
1.5.2 Temporary vs. Persistent Decline in Spreads
In some of the regressions, for example reported in Table 1.3, the significance of the
decline in spreads seems to disappear within the third year after the merger although
the same decline is both statistically and economically significant within the first
and second year after the merger. This raises the question of whether the decline in
spreads is temporary or permanent. One might argue that if the decline in spreads
disappears after three years, it would not be accurate to conclude that efficiency gains
have been passed on to the borrowers, but rather that there were only some strategic
price cuts, which are reversed later. In fact, as the event window around the merger
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gets longer, it could be more difficult to control for factors other than the merger
itself.
Panel A of Table 1.11 clearly shows that when we concentrate on mergers after
which the operating cost ratio declines are larger than the median, third-year coef-
ficients are both statistically and economically significant for the all-loans sample as
well as the large loans subsample. Although statistically not significant, the coefficient
of the third-year after-merger dummy in the small loans subsample is -7 basis points,
as well. Similarly, some other subsamples of mergers, for instance, the "Smaller-than-
Median Mergers" of a given acquirer (Table 1.4, Panel C) and "In-Market Mergers
with Large Overlap" (Table 1.8, Panel C) result in both economically and statistically
significant decline in spreads within the third year after the merger. These results
constitute important evidence that declines in spreads do not disappear within the
third year after the merger. One other subsample presented in Table 1.12 concen-
trates on our sample excluding mergers of mega acquirers with total gross assets of
at least $10 billion. As shown, when the effect of mega-mergers on loan spreads is
excluded, mergers result in, on average, about 15 basis points decline for all loans and
13 basis points decline (both significant at the 1% level) for small loans within the
third year after the merger, and this decline is persistent after the third year, as well.
Although not reported, the regressions using the subsample of mega acquirers result
in a statistically significant decline in spreads within the first year and second year,
but an increase in spreads within the third year after the mergers. Consequently,
some mega acquirers might be strategically cutting the spreads within the first two
years after the merger and then increasing them back to the pre-merger level or even
higher levels within the third year; or since these mega acquirers have many mergers
in a row, some fundamental factors other than mergers that we cannot control for,
could be affecting their loan spreads after three years.
As an alternative, instead of focusing on only three years before and after the
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merger, the same set of regressions were run by using a right-hand-side (RHS) variable
(All-the-Way after-merger dummy) that is, for a given acquirer, equal to 1 in all the
quarters after its first merger, without differentiating the type of the merger, and
otherwise is zero. Although not reported, regressions using this all-the-way after-
merger dummy variable show a 10 basis points decline (significant at 10% level) for
small loans, with loan size less than $1 million, and 13 basis points decline (significant
at 5% level) fr small loans, with loan size less than $250,000. These results further
support that, regardless of the length of the event window analyzed, spreads, on
average, decline after consolidation.
As a final check, average two-year and three-year after-merger dummies were
examined instead of year-by-year after-merger dummies. After controlling for the
loan size, basic regressions including all mergers result in average two-year declines of
12 basis points for all-loans, and 19 basis points for small loans, and average three-
year declines of 11 basis points for all-loans and 20 basis points for small loans. All
these numbers are statistically significant at the 1% level.
1.6 Deregulation as an Exogenous Instrument for the Timing
of Mergers
As mentioned before, the merger sample spans 1990-2000 because of the large
increase in the number of mergers in this time period. This increase was mainly due
to the removal of intrastate and interstate banking restrictions during the 1980s and
early 1990s. Banking literature widely recognized deregulation as the main reason
for the merger wave of the last decade (see, for instance, Andrade, Mitchell, and
Stafford (2001) for the argument that deregulation is the dominant factor in merger
and acquisition activity after the 1980s). However, one might still argue that acquirers
could be timing their mergers before the declines in their average spreads. In order
to alleviate any concerns regarding the endogeneity of the timing of the mergers in
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the sample, the variation in banking deregulation dates across states was used as an
instrument for the dates of these mergers. Since the results are driven mostly by
in-market mergers, the date (year), in which each state allowed "intrastate branching
through mergers and acquisitions" was used as the instrument for the timing of in-
market mergers. (The dates of banking deregulation across states are taken from
Kroszner and Strahan (1999).)
The results of the first-stage regressions are presented in Panel A of Table 1.13.
The regressions are at the market (MSA or non-MSA county) - quarter level. In-
Market Mrgr is an indicator variable equal to 1 if in a given quarter at least one
merger happened in that given market, and zero otherwise. Count In-Mrkt Mrgr is
equal to the total number of acquirers or targets in a given market at a given quarter,
and zero otherwise. The right-hand-side (RHS) variables are five after-deregulation
dummies, AftrDeregOne - AftrDeregFive, which span five years after the merger and
one to five years before the merger (based on data availability). 7 Since it might take
a few years after the deregulation to acquire other banks, the time period for after
deregulation dummies was extended up to five years. The dummies take the value
of 1 for all the quarters within the corresponding year after the intrastate branching
deregulation of the state that a given market belongs to, and zero otherwise. Each
regression includes time-fixed effects as well as market-fixed effects, and standard
errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the state level. As shown in
Panel A of Table 1.13, the coefficients of both variables, Count In-Mrkt Mrgr and In-
Market Mrqr are significantly positive for the fourth and fifth year after the intrastate
deregulation. However, when the predicted values from the first stage are used as the
independent variable in the market-quarter level regressions where average Spread per
37In order to capture more state variation, I extended my data for a few more years, and could
capture 22 states that deregulated their "intrastate branching restrictions through mergers" in the
time period between 1986 and 1994. This number reduces to 8 states if after-merger dummies were
created only for the states deregulated starting 1990, leaving five full years of loan-level data before
the first deregulation (since my loan-level data go back to 1985). As a robustness check, I rerun
loan-level regressions of the previous sections for this time period and the results remain unaltered.
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market is the dependent variable, the coefficients of the predicted values are negative
but not statistically significant at the 10% level. Due to their lack of power, these
second-stage regressions are not reported here.
On the other hand, given that the intrastate deregulation can predict merger-
events within four and five years' time, the direct effect of the deregulation on loan
spreads is worth exploring. Panel B of Table 1.13 presents the basic regressions of
this study, by using after-deregulation dummies instead of the after-merger dummies.
The dependent variable is the average Spread per market, collapsed by incorporating
some characteristics of loans (whether the loan is secured or not, whether it is under
commitment or not, whether it is fixed-rate or not, and whether it is a small-business
loan or not). The main independent variables are AftrDeregOne - AftrDeregFive, as
defined above. The first column of the panel shows that the average spread signif-
icantly declines by 41 basis points within the third year, 55 basis points within the
fourth year, and 57 basis points within the fifth year after the intrastate deregulation
for the all-loans sample. The statistical significance of the decline is very similar for
the small loans, as well; however, the economic magnitudes increase to -54, -71, and
-78 basis points, respectively (column (5)). In columns (4) and (6), the same regres-
sions were run by including the natural logarithm of the Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index
in order to control that the decline in spreads is not due to the increase in competi-
tion after the deregulation. The results were both economically and statistically very
similar.3 8
3 8 There were four different types of deregulation: intrastate branching through M&A, full in-
trastate branching permitted, interstate banking permitted, and multibank holding companies per-
mitted (Kroszner and Strahan (1999)). The instrument used in this paper is the variation in dereg-
ulation of intrastate branching through M&A, that is, when states started allowing banks to expand
statewide by acquiring other banks. The variation in interstate branching deregulation was also used
as an instrument; for the timing of mergers in my sample; however, the coefficients were negative but
not statistically significant. In-market mergers could happen only after the intrastate deregulation;
therefore the fact that intrastate deregulation through M&A works better as an instrument is not
surprising.
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1.7 Effect of Bank Mergers on Small Business Lending
While favorable effects of mergers on small loan interest rates have been demon-
strated, a natural question that remains unanswered is the effect of mergers on the
availability of these small loans. STBL data does not have any borrower informa-
tion, and therefore does not allow tracking what happens to the small borrowers of
the pro-forma bank (acquirer plus target before the merger) after the merger. An
alternative data source, June Call Reports, is used for this part of the analysis. Since
1993, commercial banks have reported the aggregate amount of loans drawn under
credit lines of less than $1 million in their June Call Reports; however, the data are
yearly and, unfortunately, became available only after 1993.39
The small business lending of the pro-forma bank, RatioPro-Forma, is simply
the sum of the amounts of small business loans (with commitment of less than $1
million) in the portfolios of the acquirer and the target before the merger, over their
gross total assets. This ratio is compared to the same ratio of the acquirer after the
merger (RatioAfter) in order to see whether some of the small borrowers of the target
were dropped from acquirer's loan portfolio or not. For each merger-year, a mean
difference test is run in order to see whether the change in ratios after the merger
is significant or not. Since the data are yearly, the test below uses any merger-year,
including all the mergers and "within-family" mergers of a given acquirer in a given
year.
3 9Because of ambiguity in the 1993 instructions, which was corrected in 1994, some banks are
known to have reported incorrectly in 1993. In order to minimize possibilities of inaccuracy in the
data, I dropped observations regarding 1993 from my sample.
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Mega Large Medium
All Mergers Acquirers Acquirers Acquirers
Mean RatioAfter 0.0588 0.04096 0.0617 0.0917
Mean RatioPro-Forma 0.0602 0.04289 0.0629 0.0924
Mean Difference -0.0014 -0.00193 -0.0012 -0.0007
t-statistics (-1.35) (-1.42) (-0.79) (-0.23)
No. of Observations 122 40 66 16
The first two rows of the above table report the mean values of the small business
lending ratio of the acquirer after the merger and the pro-forma bank before the merger.
The first column lists the ratios and mean difference test results for all the merger-years
in my sample after 1993 while columns 2 to 4 list the values for subsamples of merger-
years based on acquirer size. Mega, Large, and Medium Acquirers are the acquiring
banks with gross total assets of at least $10 billion, between $1 billion and $10 billion,
and between $100 million and $1 billion, respectively. The mean difference test shows
that the change in the mean ratios is negative, but not statistically significant, even for
the mega-acquirers subsample. Moreover, analyses of the quantities of small business
lending before and after the mergers show that the amount of small business lending of
the acquirer increased after the merger. In fact, for 37 of the total 122 merger-years, the
change in ratios was positive, meaning that after the mergers some acquirers increased
small business lending beyond the small borrowers of the target. While these results
provide evidence that after merging with smaller targets, acquirers do not drop all the
small business lending of the target, it is possible that they drop very risky borrowers
and keep the relatively transparent ones or obtain new small borrowers through the
target's markets. The reason for the increase in small business lending in acquirer's
portfolio could be shifts in lending technologies after the merger, or diversification
motives of the acquirer.
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Moreover, technological improvements that create opportunities for small business
owners to provide more "hard" information about their companies could be the main
reason for these small business loans to stay in the large acquirers' loan portfolios.
The findings of this chapter could be indicating that the large banks now value small
business lending much more in their portfolios. However, DeYoung et al. (2005)
provide empirical evidence that lenders that use credit scoring models experience
higher default rates, while Berger et al. (2005a) show that credit scoring is associated
with higher prices and more risk for the small loans with loan size less than $100,000.
The effect of the latest improvements in small-business-lending technologies on loan
portfolios of large banks is a topic worth exploring in further research.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter supports the hypothesis that bank mergers benefit small borrowers by
creating reductions in interest rates on their commercial and industrial loans. This
reduction in spreads after the merger is interpreted as some efficiency gains being
passed on to the borrowers. These efficiencies could be created by changes in lending
technologies (clientele effect) and diversification of risk, which could affect the spreads
in a relatively short time after the merger. Furthermore, the reduction in spreads
could also be due to scale and/or scope efficiencies, which could take relatively more
time to be realized. In order to test the argument that the decline in the spreads is
due to efficiency gains reflected in loan rates rather than shifts in borrower quality,
the after-merger changes in the operating cost ratios for the merging banks were
analyzed. The decline in spreads is both economically and statistically much larger
for the mergers with larger-than-median decline in their operating cost ratios than for
the mergers with smaller-than-median decline and the difference is highly significant.
Furthermore, the decline in the spreads is the most significant for mergers in which
acquirer and the target have market overlap before the merger, but not so extensive
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as to create concerns for market power effects.
Moreover, the analyses compare the same acquirers before and after the mergers.
Since targets have (on average) smaller and riskier loans, the average interest rate in
the acquirer's portfolio is expected to increase after this portfolio is consolidated with
that of the target. However, after controlling for the size and some other character-
istics of the loans, empirical evidence shows that acquirers charge significantly lower
rates on their new loan extensions, and this reduction is driven by small loans.
Although the analysis provides significant evidence for efficiency gains benefiting
borrowers as the result of bank mergers, the loan size (which is equal to the total
commitment amount if the loan is drawn under commitment and otherwise to the
face value) was used as a proxy for the borrower size, instead of the borrower's
own asset size. This leaves open the possibility that the results could be driven
by shifts in borrower composition at a given loan size. However, since robustness
checks did not show any significant change in the ratio of certain characteristics of
loans within a bank's loan portfolio after the merger, this seems highly unlikely. On
the contrary, given the loan size, the ratio of secured loans or floating-rate loans
within the acquirer's portfolio are found to be significantly increasing within the first
year after the merger. This would bias results in the opposite direction, since secured
loans and floating-rate loans are relatively riskier. Further, the nonperforming loans
ratio of the acquirers after the merger does not change at all, ruling out any shifts in
the riskiness of the loan portfolio.
In addition to the pricing effect of mergers, the effect on loan availability to small
businesses was also explored. After mergers, acquirers might be expected to be drop-
ping all the risky, opaque borrowers in the loan portfolio of the targets. However,
the amount; of small business lending of the acquirer increases after the merger. Ad-
ditionally, the average change in the ratio of small business lending of the acquirer
after the merger compared to the same ratio of the pro-forma bank (target plus
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acquirer) before the merger is not statistically significant at the 10 % level. The
data for the quantities of small business lending are available only after 1993, and
this period mostly coincides with the implementation of credit scoring technologies
for commercial loans. Therefore, technological improvements applied to commercial
lending could be the reason for the insignificance of the mean change in small business
lending ratios because these improvements created opportunities for large banks to
acquire more hard information about small businesses.
Contrary to what might be expected by people distrustful of the presumed greater
bargaining power of larger institutions, bigger acquirers do not impose less favorable
pricing terms on small businesses seeking to borrow. Indeed, the findings of this
chapter show that small borrowers typically pay lower interest rates to banks that
have expanded during the previous two years through mergers. The favorable effects
of the mergers reflected in small loan prices could be indicating that the large banks
now value small business lending much more in their portfolios. However, DeYoung
et al. (2005) provide empirical evidence that lenders that use credit scoring models
experience higher default rates, while Berger et al. (2005a) show that credit scoring
is associated with higher prices and more risk for the small loans with loan size less
than $100,000. How improvements in small-business-lending technologies will affect
the composition and the riskiness of large banks' loan portfolios, is a topic that
deserves further research.
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Table 1.1- Descriptive Statistics of Banks in Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL)
The descriptive statistics in Panel A refer to the entire sample of bank-quarters covered by Survey of Terms of
Business Lending (STBL) from 1987 to 2003. Panels B and C list the summary statistics for the STBL sample of
acquirers and targets, as of one quarter before the merger. Total assets are gross total assets of the bank from Call
Reports, and descriptive statistics refer to each bank-quarter. Sum of Total Assets is the quarterly sum of the gross
total assets of STBL banks, and the ratio below this variable corresponds to this value expressed as a percentage of
all banking assets in a given year. Total assets, total loans and total deposits are all expressed in 2003 dollars by
using GDP price deflator. Capitalization is the ratio of equity to gross total assets. ROA is the net income over total
assets at the end of the previous year.
loans not accruing, to the total loans.
Non-performing Loans Ratio equals to the ratio of loans 90 days late plus
PANEL A: All Banks in STBL
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N of Obs.
TotalAssets ($ million) 9,749 1,202 32,903 4.1 665,928 21,133
Sum of Total Assets ($ billion) 2,731 2,288 631.5 1,971 4,082 68
STBL Assets/All Banks'Assets 0.53 0.52 0.03 0.46 0.6 68
Total Loans ($ million) 5,608 719 17,749 2 318,575 21,133
Sum of Total Loans ($ billion) 1,589 1,432 327.4 1,068 2,239 68
STBL Loans/All Banks'Loans 0.52 0.52 0.03 0.44 0.58 68
Total Deposits ($ million) 6,582 977 20,884 3.9 381,235 21,133
Sum of Total Deposits ($ billion) 1,867 1,670 334 1,376 2,625 68
STBL Deposits/All Banks'Deposits 0.50 0.49 0.04 0.43 0.58 68
Capitalization 0.08 0.08 0.028 0.0002 0.537 21,133
ROA 0.009 0.01 0.009 -0.18 0.0456 19,414
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.021 0.012 0.027 0 0.53 21,133
PANEL B: Acquirers in STBL
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N of Obs.
Total Assets ($ million) 16,014 6,100 24,922 145.3 177,083 263
Total Loans ($ million) 10,290 3,334 16,842 58.9 107,340 263
Total Deposits ($ million) 11,558 4,730 17,394 125.4 118,532 263
Capitalization 0.079 0.076 0.016 0.043 0.154 263
ROA 0.085 0.082 0.013 0.022 0.142 254
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.012 0.008 0.012 0.001 0.1 263
PANEL C: Targets of Acquirers in STBL
Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum N of Obs.
TotalAssets ($ million) 1,419 184 5,738 13.4 43,642 333
Total Loans ($ million) 809 90.8 3,449 6.58 43,642 333
Total Deposits ($ million) 1,104 156 4,365 12.2 50,496 333
Capitalization 0.09 0.085 0.04 0.001 0.32 333
ROA 0.007 0.009 0.012 -0.18 0.05 321
Non-Performing Loans Ratio 0.015 0.009 0.019 0 0.13 333
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Table 1.3- The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices - "All Loans" Sample
The dependent variable is Spread, the effective annual interest rate on the loan minus treasury rate of equal
duration. AftrMrgrOne, AftrMrgrTwo and AftrMrgrThree are dummy variables equal to zero for twelve
quarters before and after the merger, except that AftrMrgrOne is equal to one for the first four quarters
after the merger, AftrMrgrTwo is equal to one for the fifth to eighth quarters after the merger, and
AftrMrgrThree is equal to one for the ninth to twelfth quarters after the merger. LoanSize is equal to the
natural logarithm of the commitment amount if the loan is under commitment and to the face amount of the
loan otherwise. AcquirerSize is the natural logarithm of gross total assets of the acquirer as of.
NonperformRatio is nonperforming loans ratio, which is calculated as the sum of loans over 90 days late
and loans not accruing over total loans as of t-1. MrgrSize is, in all the quarters within three years before
and after the merger, equal to the natural logarithm of the size of the target as of one quarter before the
merger, zero otherwise. DummyCommit is equal to one if the loan is under commitment, and zero
otherwise. DummyFixed is equal to one if the loan is a fixed-rate loan, and is equal to zero if it is a
floating-rate loan. DummySecured is equal to one if the loan is secured by collateral of any kind, zero else.
StateDummy is a dummy variable equal to one if the target and the acquirer were in the same state before
the merger. MrktHHI is the natural logarithm of the average deposit Hirfindahl-Hirschman Index of the
banking-markets of the acquirer. A "merger" event is the consolidation of two banks, in which the charter
of the "target" disappears. I do not include the merger quarter in the regressions. All the regressions use
quarterly loan level data and they all include time fixed effects (67 quarter dummies) as well as bank fixed
effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors
of observations at the bank level.
All Loans
are corrected for clustering
AftrMrgrOne
AftrMrgrTwo
AftrMrgrThree
LoanSize
AcquirerSize
MrgrSize
DumSecured
DumFixed
DumCommit
NonperformRatio
StateDummy
ArktHHI
-0.03
(-0.28)
63
(1)
-0.07**
i-2.03)
-0.1 1***
(-3.47)
-0.02
(-0.56)
(2)
-0.07**
(-2.18)
-0.07***
(-2.91)
0.03
(0.93)
-0.29***
(-11.5)
0.03
(0.5)
(4)
-0.07* *
(-2.25)
-0.07***
(-3.21)
0.03
(0.82)
-0.3***
(-11.14)
(3)
-0.07**
(-2.06)
-0.07***
(-2.85)
0.03
(0.99)
-0.3***
(-11.17)
0.01
(0.71)
0.01
(0.18)
(5)
-0.06*
(-1.85)
-0.07***
(-2.54)
0.001
(0.15)
-0.28***
(-11.37)
0.001
(0.11)
0.09
(1.15)
(6)
-0.07**
(-2.19)
-0.06***
(-2.58)
0.02
(0.64)
-0.28***
(-13.16)
0.04
(0.53)
(7)
-0.08**
(-2.38)
-0.08***
(-2.92)
-0.001
(-0.04)
-0.28***
(-10.67)
-0.002
(-0.04)
(8)
-0.07***
(-2.23)
-0.11***
(-3.28)
-0.04
(-1.13)
0.03
(0.5)
0.01
(0.87)
0.47***
(11.24)
-0.81***
(-7.24)
1.83
(0.98)
0.49***
(8.16)
-0.83***
(-8.43)
-0.48***
(-4.34)
1.4
(1.04)
-0.06
(-1.51)
1.15
(0.83)
-0.09**
(-2.00)
1.56
(1.15)
-0.07*
(-1.72)
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.41 0.23
N of Observations 655,184 655,184 616,347 616,347 619,534 591,533 619,534 619,534
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively
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Table 1.5- The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices - Small vs. Large Loans
This table presents the effect of mergers on the loan Spread for different size categories of loans. Different
categories are based on loan size, which is equal to the total commitment amount if the loan is drawn under
commitment and face value of the loan otherwise. The boundaries of the size categories are listed at the top
of each column's regression coefficients. In the first panel ("After-Merger Dummies"), AftrMrgrOne,
AftrMrgrTwo and AftrMrgrThree are dummy variables equal to zero for twelve quarters before and after
the merger, except that AftrMrgrOne is equal to one for the first four quarters after the merger,
AftrMrgrTwo is equal to one for the fifth to eighth quarters after the merger, and AftrMrgrThree is equal
to one for the ninth to twelfth quarters after the merger. In the second panel ("After-Last-Merger
Dummies"), after merger dummies are equal to one as described above only if it is the corresponding year's
after merger dummy of the most recent merger. All the regressions use quarterly loan level data and they all
include time fixed effects (67 quarter dummies) as well as bank fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are corrected for clustering of observations at the bank level.
PANEL A: After-Merger Dummies
Small Loans
with Loan Size
AftrMrgrOne
AftrMrgrTwo
AftrMrgr Three
LoanSize
AcquirerSize
Adjusted R2
N. of Observations
$100,000
-0.23***
(-5.84)
-0.16**
(-3.02)
0.03
(0.43)
-0.23***
(-6.98)
0.32***
(3.41)
0.24
154,137
$250,000
-0.21 **
(-4.83)
-0.16**
(-4.93)
0.03
(0.68)
-0.22***
(-7.84)
0.23***
(3.28)
0.25
222,634
PANEL B:
with Loan Size
AftrMrgrOne
AftrMrgrTwo
AftrMrgrThree
LoanSize
AcquirerSize
$100,000
-0.30***
(6.09)
-0.23***
(-2.97)
0.034
(0.39)
-0.23***
(-6.95)
0.32***
(3.37)
$250,0(
-0.28*'
(-5.33
-0.23 * 
(-4.46
-0.003
(-0.05
-0.22* 
(-7.82
0.24**
(3.29)
$250,000-
$1 Million
-0.06
(-1.55)
-0.07*
(-1.94)
0.02
(0.65)
-0.37***
(-4.41)
-0.06
(-0.82)
0.28
135,479
$1 Million
-0.15**
(-3.85)
-0.14***
(-4.44)
0.03
(0.89)
-0.24***
(-7.89)
0.13**
(2.13)
0.27
358,113
Small Loans
Large Loans
> $1 Million
0.04
(1.45)
0.03
(1.25)
0.05
(1.63)
-0.38***
(-12.94)
-0.02
(-0.18)
0.29
297,071
After-Last-Merger DummiesPANEL B:~ ~~~~~~~~25,00
$250,000-
00 $1 Million
** -0.13**
) (-2.31)
** -0.13***
)) (-2.64)
4 -0.08*
;) (-1.88)
** -0.37***
7) (-4.39)
* -0.03
I) (-0.48)
Large Loans
$1 Million > $1 Million
-0.23*** 0.024
(-4.41) (0.36)
-0.20*** 0.014
(-4.49) (0.19)
-0.03 -0.024
(-0.63) (-0.27)
-0.24*** -0.38***
(-7.88) (-12.88)
0.14** 0.002
(2.35) (0.03)
Adjusted R 2
N of Observations
0.24
154,137
0.25
222,63
0.28
4 135,479
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and
0.27 0.29
358,113 297,071
10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 1.6- The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices - Different Loan Characteristics
This table shows the effect of mergers on the Spread on loans of different loan characteristics. In Panel A, our
original set of regressions were run first including only the loans drawn under commitment (Loans Under
Commitment) and then for loans that are not under commitment (Loans not under Commitment). And Panel B
includes same set of regressions for subsamples based on whether the loan is secured or not (Loans Secured by
Collateral vs. Loans not Secured by Collateral). AftrMrgrOne, AftrMrgrTwo and AftrMrgrThree are dummy
variables equal to zero for twelve quarters before and after the merger, except that AftrMrgrOne is equal to
one for the first four quarters after the merger, AftrMrgrTwo is equal to one for the fifth to eighth quarters after
the merger, and AftrMrgrThree is equal to one for the ninth to twelfth quarters after the merger. All the
regressions use quarterly loan level data and they all include time fixed effects (67 quarter dummies) as well as
bank fixed effects. Small Loans are loans with LoanSize less than $1 Million. Large Loans are loans with
LoanSize larger than $1 Million. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics
corrected for clustering of observations at the bank level.
are in parentheses. Standard errors are
Loans under Commitment
All
Loans
-0.07
(-1.14)
-0.064
(-1.14)
-0.02
(-0.25)
-0.35***
(-14.65)
0.02
(0.32)
Small
Loans
-0.18***
(-2.71)
-0.154***
(-2.87)
-0.01
(-0.22)
-0.32***
(-10.36)
0.104*
(1.71)
Large
Loans
0.04
(0.52)
0.03
(0.39)
-0.01
(-0.14)
-0.39***
(-12.42)
0.003
(0.03)
Loans not under Commitment
All
Loans
-0.38***
(-4.89)
-0.37***
(-4.32)
-0.08
(-0.92)
-0.31**
(-13.53)
0.19
(1.36)
Small
Loans
-0.40***
(-5.18)
-0.38***
(-4.51)
-0.06
(-0.66)
-0.27***
(-11.73)
0.18
(1.38)
Large
Loans
0.07
(0.62)
-0.04
(-0.27)
-0.17
(-1.06)
-0.34***
(-13.23)
-0.41
(-1.35)
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.3 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.48
N. of Observations 546,421 256,957 289,464 108,763 101,156 7,607
PANEL B: Loans Secured by Collateral Loans not Secured by Collateral
All Small Large All Small Large
Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans
AftrMrgrOne -0.14*** -0.23*** 0.00 -0.06 -0.16** 0.09
(-2.86) (-4.04) (0.01) (-0.78) (-2.22) (0.88)
AftrMrgrTwo -0.15** -0.21*** -0.025 0.03 -0.05 0.09
(-3.6) (-4.76) (-0.4) (0.27) (-0.45) (0.82)
AfirMrgrThree -0.11 * -0.10** -0.065 0.23** 0.24** 0.15
(-1.86) (-2.02) (-0.8) (2.06) (2.14) (1.55)
LoanSize -0.24*** -0.18*** -0.26*** -0.41 ** -0.43*** -0.42***
(-8.15) (-6.0) (-9.13) (-19.33) (-11.28) (-19.06)
AcquirerSize -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.34** 0.5*** 0.004
(-0.12) (0.6) (0.23) (2.33) (2.8) (0.02)
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.26 0.26 0.53 0.39 0.33
N of Observations 520,786 286,264 234,522 134,396 71,847 62,549
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
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PANEL A:
AftrMrgrOne
AftrMrgrTwo
AftrMrgrThree
LoanSize
AcquirerSize
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Table 1.12- The Effect of Bank Mergers on Loan Prices - Mega Acquirers Excluded
This table shows the results of my basic regressions, with Spread as the dependent variable, by excluding
the mega acquirers. Mega acquirers are the acquiring banks with total gross assets larger than $10 billion.
AftrMrgrOne, AftrMrgrTwo and AftrMrgrThree are dummy variables equal to zero for twelve quarters
before and after the merger, except that AftrMrgrOne is equal to one for the first four quarters after the
merger, AftrMrgrTwo is equal to one for the fifth to eighth quarters after the merger, and AftrMrgrThree is
equal to one for the ninth to twelfth quarters after the merger. LoanSize is the natural logarithm of the
commitment amount if the loan is drawn under commitment and the face value of the loan otherwise.
AcquirerSize is the natural logarithm of gross total assets of the acquirer as of t-1. Small Loans are loans
with LoanSize less than $1 Million. Large Loans are loans with LoanSize larger than $1 Million. All the
regressions use quarterly loan level data and they all include time fixed effects (67 quarter dummies) as
well as bank fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Standard errors are
corrected for clustering of observations at the bank level.
All Loans
AftrMrgrOne
AftrMrgrTwo
AftrMrgrThree
LoanSize
AcquirerSize
(1)
-0.02
(-0.48)
-0.05
(-0.96)
-0.15***
(-2.83)
-0.26***
(-12.75)
0.15
(1.53)
Without the Mergers of Mega Acquirers
Small Loans
(2)
-0.09*
(-1.77)
-0.09*
(-1.66)
-0.16***
(-3.31)
-0.20***
(-7.96)
0.20*
(1.74)
Large Loans
(3)
0.09*
(1.75)
0.06
(0.85)
-0.11
(-0.89)
-0.38***
(-15.80)
0.08
(1.01)
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.25 0.32
N of Observations 304,615 175,062 129,553
The symbols ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
72
alN I' * I' * "T*(7 * 0 en 0r. 
I, I: W~ " a ;~ r 0 t 
- 9 9 9 I I 1 Ij> - 1 6 -
Rn~ t I '-'f- * * ~
r- "T 00 00*~~~~~~~~00 It0 0 0 -~(I l . C t .= 4 9I I: 911 01.101. I -, 4 !!-
-O 11 r00 'C0,N 'I Z* c * 0-'*
,.I 9 *: -: ON mO Cl O . &--* "O *c~ 6 - ll~- n * -;. *I  *m9 , -
0 09
r- ;;,t * - * - * i:: * C-,*O :~ N c ; 00 * ON*l
Cl)C) 'I w~ al .- 00 * -o -I ~~I~~~ - I kn 0 CD I 
Cloo oo
'5 
 
-0 Cl
0 0
*
oLONoo
00* .-60 .-0el
IQ Qa a a IQ. 
Ia. Ia. Ia. I..4 I
Z iz %)
' *
. _
W) CN,l el
L
6Cq
I
wi
0
(Z0
E
_n
0
0
t
.1t
4
42:
C:4
2
CO 
0;
4-I
E
c
.o
C
2
Cu
C.
C)4
4-m
00 i
CN c0,
00
CN 0 0
c.
n C
0 C.
0
C.
9
C
(I
CN
0 CN
O -
0C.
n ;,
Z
aU
Cu
E ,It I
M :1
S,.
C GC s;
1W 0aa3
CCtLo ~
o ~
1., c c g
42L'e S4-| C.
~ 02C) °. -o
-0N
0 .b ro
- ' - 0 >
C~ t v0
.
c 
H ~ '"^
=l v 0 0r 
-e _ 
P_ X C. ) 
X O 
*_ 4.->
I
I
PI
CI
IIC
-I!
0
4.
C
II
1:
4.
II
I
tI
C
i
II
II
IC
I,<le
11I
C
1I
CI
IL
C.
4.-I
M
S;
C.)
C.)
.)
0
M
02
4.-
a.)
4-
0
'A1
0 O
C)O01 0
Ip I
M *0 *
4-A
s O
C,
0
In
0
C.)
- O,4 - * T. C
6 6 00 °C ° t o C 
-I I . .I I -
.....~- I
*00 *
I 4 
_C I
'11 * *
0_ 0 6 o
I Ikf r_
~ ' '-- ,..4 (",CD1 14 I, S I, - °, - Co,. o ,'0 0 7 6 7 r 1~ I . 4
*
*
*
6
_no;
E,'Zr *02
0 *
01SI0 *C
Cl
01
0 r
tQ O3
4-0
0 *
= )
02
*
, *Lr2 *
r00
0 C
Cr 0
r _
C 9 1
* -C Mm , C _
I- 0 I I
*00 *
I 0
'n *
Ij,) *
N *t
* Cl4
(6l
,CO _n c)
00 N- *)
--4 01q 
Cr C rC -
6 0 0 0 l
N- Z In Cl400 0 000 C In
C" I7 ID I4 t
0 O,- Cl N 
0L 0 - 0
*
,'*
CrC6 
00
C-
I
0
'iII
I(
C
C
11
a
I
'-9 *
r_ * -
_ t I
/ C)O
N- *
rl C>C-
o 
O *
*
* C)CrCO
0 M
O _
0
C
I,
C'
*
* ^ _
*5 0- -
* C 9
* -
* _ Cl NI7 - _r5 o,
14-
4.. 4... 4.. %.)
.-~t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ t z i
$.. $. $. ,
f90
C ~r
t-Cr6 t
_ C00
. 0
Cl0N
a- n
N Cl
* (O,
CI
C
.4
'I
i
C,
C
C'
CI
C,
LnN
0
>
0
En
Du
9 r
V
UI.)
.)
._
. 0
.5
0
._
*
-o
MI v
*
*
*
*
0u
-E)
H1
el)
C
0 
L) -
0
I
I
0
Z
II
I
I
I
?
I I
2 Chapter 2
Incentive-based Regulation of Banks:
An Interpretation of Basel II
2.1 Introduction
This chapter models banks' incentives for "regulatory capital arbitrage" under the
current capital adequacy rules. Because the risk exposures of different types of banks
cannot be precisely measured, banks making risky investments pool with the banks
investing safely so that they can be subject to a lower amount of regulatory capital.
The new Basel II rules are an attempt to solve these problems with the current system.
I show that Basel II's Internal Ratings-based (IRB) Approach can be interpreted as
a way of forcing a separating equilibrium in which good banks that do not pursue
unduly risky strategies identify themselves to the regulators and are rewarded with a
lower capital requirement.
Current capital adequacy regulations define risk categories for bank assets based
on their observable characteristics. Assets in the riskier categories receive higher risk
weights. The categories are broad, however, and banks can substitute high-risk assets
for low-risk assets within each category, with no requirement to increase their risk-
based capital. This risk-shifting is known as "regulatory capital arbitrage" (RCA),
and is driven by the difference between a bank's actual economic risk exposures and
the exposures as assessed by the regulators. As pointed out by Jones (2000), these
divergences enable banks to repackage their portfolio risks in order to hold much
less capital than implied by the economic risks incurred. RCA is implemented by
unbundling and repackaging risks of assets, for example, through securitization of
the banks' highest quality assets ("cherry-picking"), so that a portion of the credit
risk of the bank loans is treated as if these loans belonged to an asset category with
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lower risk weights, consequently lowering effective capital requirements for these risky
assets.
In response to criticisms of the current capital requirements that as crude rules
they introduce divergences between economic risks and their regulatory counterparts,
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a proposal of amendment,
known as "Basel II." The Committee completed the new Accord in June 2004 and
implementation is intended to take effect in member countries by year-end 2006.40
Under the new Accord, there are primarily two approaches to defining the capi-
tal requirements. First is the "Standardized Approach," which slightly modifies the
current risk-based system by adding, based on the estimates of some private credit
agencies, new risk categories to evaluate the risk-weighted asset portfolios of banks.
However, the change is a very superficial one since the new risk weights continue to
allow only a very limited number of categories.
Second is the "Internal Ratings-based (IRB) Approach," which will be an alter-
native option for banks that satisfy an infrastructure requirements. Under the IRB
approach, if a bank's risk estimate models meet the criteria of the supervisors, the
bank will be allowed to use its internal risk measurement models in order to assess
the riskiness of its loan portfolios and estimate its required amount of capital. The
IRB approach will be a more supervision-oriented system, in which supervisors check
whether banks that decide to opt in have adequate levels of risk measurement in-
frastructure, and based on the risk estimates of the approved banks, interactively set
the relevant capital requirements for them. The main criticism of this approach is the
possibility that banks will mislead the regulator about risk estimates. (See, for in-
stance, Danielsson et al. (2001) and Ward (2002), whose arguments will be described
in section 2.4.)
This chapter offers a different perspective on Basel II. Contrary to what might be
4 0See Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (2003) for an overview of the new Basel
Capital Accord.
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expected, Basel II does not create incentives for all types of banks to use their own
internal risk measurement models and to truthfully report their correct credit and
market risk values. Indeed, the changes coming with Basel II could be interpreted as
an attempt to reach a more efficient separating equilibrium, in which banks investing
safely choose to adopt their own internal risk measurement systems, while banks
making highly risky investments choose to stay with the old standardized system.
The argument is simple. Banks invest in an optimal portfolio of positive NPV
good loans and zero NPV risky loans. Given the existence of the deposit insurance
guarantee by the regulator, the tradeoff between the risk-shifting incentives and the
continuation value can make banks choose corner solutions. Some banks choose to
invest only in good loans in order to preserve their continuation value by minimizing
their bankruptcy probability. On the other hand, some banks invest heavily in risky
loans in order to exploit the deposit insurance provided by the regulator. If these good
and risky loans are subcategories of the same asset-risk category, the regulator cannot
see the details within the risk category and consequently does not know which type of
bank he or she is dealing with. The current capital requirements lead to an inefficient
pooling equilibrium, in which banks making highly risky investments pretend to be
investing safely in order to have the same capital requirement as banks making safer
investments. This equilibrium is socially costly for two main reasons. First, holding
equity size constant, the increase in the capital requirements for safe banks puts an
upper bound on bank assets, and consequently on good loans to entrepreneurs. Sec-
ond, the decline in the capital requirements for risky banks increases their probability
of bankruptcy, which is already much higher than that for safe banks, and hence the
probability that deadweights costs of bankruptcy in addition to some other costs due
to loss of fixed capital are incurred in the economy.
Under Basel II, the regulator will offer banks an option to switch to their own
internal risk models as long as they satisfy some infrastructure criteria. Safe banks,
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by exercising this option, can identify themselves to the regulator. The banks that
choose to use their internal risk models will be under close supervision. However, the
information asymmetry problem of the current system will not be totally eliminated
because of the difficulty of implementing an efficient back-testing. Therefore, risky
banks can try to opt into the IRB approach and misreport the risk estimates. How-
ever, given that supervisors will visit banks more often and work closely with them
on setting capital ratios, there will be some probability that a bank pretending to
be investing safely, but in fact making highly risky investments, would be caught by
the supervisors. Additionally, banks will incur high set-up costs in order to meet the
infrastructure criteria for risk estimation and also will incur continuous supervision
costs. Given these costs, if all the safe banks switch to the IRB approach, risky
banks will be better off trying to opt into the IRB approach, instead of staying in
the standardized approach and thereby identifying themselves as risky banks to the
regulator. To avoid this inefficient pooling, the regulator can create incentives for
the risky banks not to switch to using their internal risk measurement models by
setting the capital requirements for the risky banks lower than their first-best. Thus,
a separating equilibrium, in which safe banks identify themselves by adopting the
IRB approach, can be sustained.4 1
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the
existing literature on risk taking, banking regulation, and capital requirements. Sec-
tion 2.3 describes the main players of the model and shows the inefficient pooling
equilibrium under the current capital requirements. Section 2.4 analyzes Basel II and
derives the separating equilibrium and the conditions to sustain this equilibrium, and
also briefly summarizes the planned implementation of the Basel II rules in the U.S.
41The implementation of the Basel II rules in the U.S. will be slightly different from the proposed
Accord since about the ten largest banking firms in the U.S. will be obliged to adopt the IRB
approach. That is because the regulators want these largest banks to invest in their internal risk
assessment systems since they constitute the core of the U.S. financial system. Other banks will be
given the option to switch to the IRB approach as long as they meet the infrastructure criteria.
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Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Relationship to Existing Literature
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993), Freixas and Rochet (1997), Santos (2000), and
Palia and Porter (2003) provide reviews of the banking literature and contemporary
issues in bank capital regulation. Moral hazard under the fixed-rate deposit insurance
system was first formalized by Merton (1977), which shows that deposit insurance can
be viewed as a put option on the value of banks' assets, with a strike price equal to
the promised maturity value of its debt. Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration's fixed-rate deposit insurance system, banks are tempted to borrow at or
below the risk-free rate through insured deposits, and invest in risky assets in order
to maximize the value of this put option, and consequently their equity, by increasing
the risk of their asset portfolios. (See Kane (1985), Keeley (1990), Flannery (1991),
and Cole et al. (1995) for the incentives to take on excessive risk ("gambling for res-
urrection") that the deposit insurance system with insurance premiums independent
of risk creates.)4 2
The Basel Accord imposes capital adequacy requirements on banks in an effort to
control these moral hazard problems.4 3 In order to be compatible with the current
regulatory system, this study takes the existence of the fixed-rate deposit insurance as
given and assumes that the guarantor of the deposit insurance aims to adjust capital
requirements, instead of the deposit insurance premiums, in order to set the expected
4 2See also Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) arguing that in the presence of moral hazard and
adverse selection of banks, fairly priced deposit insurance may be impossible. However, Giammarino,
Lewis, and Sappington (1993) shows an optimal design of risk-adjusted deposit insurance in the
presence of adverse selection and moral hazard.
43 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord (the "Accord"), elaborated by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), created by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), required banks of the
G10O countries to hold capital equal to at least 8% of their risk-adjusted assets. These prudential
regulations were adopted in the U.S. through the FDIC Improvement Act in 1991. With the 1997
Market Risk Amendment, capital adequacy rules were amended to cover market risk. See Basel
Committee oni Banking Supervision (1988, 1997).
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loss of providing deposit guarantee equal to zero.4 4
There are many papers showing that, contrary to what is intended, capital ad-
equacy requirements fail to control risk taking. (See, for example, Koehn and San-
tomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Genotte and Pyle (1991), Rochet (1992),
Berger, Herring and Szego (1995), Besanko and Kanatas (1996), and Blum (1999).)
While one side of the banks' trade-off, which affects their investment choices, is this
risk-shifting incentive, the other side of the trade-off is the loss of charter value in
case of bankruptcy. The discounted stream of current and future rents on real loans is
called charter (franchise) value in the banking literature, and since this charter value
is lost when the bank goes bankrupt, it creates incentives for the banks to choose
more conservative levels of risk and leverage. (See, for instance, Furlong and Keeley
(1989), Keeley (1990), Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000), Pelizzon (2001), Gan
(2004), and Repullo (2004).) This study does not question the validity of capital re-
quirements as a regulatory mechanism, but analyzes the regulatory capital arbitrage
incentives that the current system creates.
Since this study has a dynamic setting, which is relatively uncommon in the
literature, the model endogenizes the charter (franchise) value of the bank. The
dynamic nature of the model set-up is similar to Hellman, Murdock, and Stiglitz
(2000), which shows that capital requirement regulation without a deposit rate ceiling
yields inefficient outcomes. However, the essence of my study, which is about the
regulatory capital arbitrage incentives of the banks, is the asymmetric information
within a risk category. Therefore, the model should incorporate at least two different
assets with both random returns and positive variances. In Hellman, Murdock, and
4 4Allen and Gale (2003) argue that one bad policy (deposit insurance) should not justify others
and in the absence of welfare-relevant pecuniary externality, banks would choose their socially op-
timal capital structure themselves, without government intervention. Their argument is based on
assumptions of complete markets and the absence of financial crises. This paper does not question
the validity of the deposit insurance. See the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) for an
explicit model of the rationale for its existence. And see also Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) for a
representation theory of banking regulation, in which the prudential regulation aims to protect the
interests of the depositors while avoiding bank-runs.
80
Stiglitz (2000), the prudent asset has a constant return, and the gambling asset has
binomial payoffs. Such a set-up would help the regulator infer, after just a few periods,
which asset the bank is investing in, and therefore would not be applicable to this
study. Moreover, in my model, the probability of bankruptcy depends on the random
returns as well, while it is fixed in their model. Pelizzon (2001) also uses a similar
dynamic model and comes up with a similar value function to this chapter's in order
to show how different sources of rents ("underpriced deposit insurance, supernormal
returns on banks, and imperfect competition for deposits") affect banks' risk-taking
behavior. In her model, although there is one risky asset that has a random return,
the second asset is a risk-free bond, which again would not be compatible with this
study's premise of asymmetric information between the banks and the regulator. To
my knowledge, this is the first study that both formally models regulatory capital
arbitrage within a risk category in a dynamic setting, and also analytically shows the
separating equilibrium interpretation of the Basel II rules.
There is an extensive literature analyzing both the movement towards using one's
own internal risk models instead of the "one-size-fits-all" approach and also the newly
proposed accord, Basel II. There are two main criticisms of using internal risk mod-
els. The first concerns the drawbacks of all possible risk estimation models (see
Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a), Rochet (1999), Danielsson (2000), Embrechts, McNeil
and Straumann (2000), and Danielsson et al. (2001)). The second concerns the cycli-
cal implications of Basel II standards: the argument is that the new capital standards
will exacerbate business cycles (see Danielsson et al. (2001), Danielsson, Shin, and
Zigrand (2002), Ward (2002b), Danielsson and Zigrand (2003), Kashyap and Stein
(2004), and Gordy and Howells (2004)). This study does not argue that Basel II reg-
ulations will be the most efficient system of regulation. It shows that under Basel II
rules, it is possible to have a more efficient separating equilibrium than the inefficient
pooling equilibrium of the current system if high supervision criteria are met. By
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suggesting such a different interpretation of Basel II, this study also exempts itself
from the above criticisms.
An alternative to internal risk models approach was suggested by Kupiec and
O'Brien (1995b, 1997), and is called "Pre-commitment Approach (PCA)."4 5 The PCA
would require each bank to state the maximum loss exposure for its trading portfolio
over a fixed subsequent period. The capital charge for market risk would be equal
to this pre-committed maximum loss. If the bank incurs trading losses exceeding the
pre-committed level, penalties would be imposed that are proportional to the amount
of excess loss. PCA was criticized as being applicable to only well-capitalized banks
(see, for instance, Daripa and Varotto (1997)).
2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Model Set-up and Assumptions
There are two main players in this model: "banks" and "the regulator." Although
banks are highly regulated and their assets are partly verifiable, there still exists in-
formation asymmetry between banks and the regulator. The current Basel Accord
defines risk categories based on observable characteristics of bank assets and assigns
a higher risk weight to higher risk categories. The final capital requirement for each
bank is set based on the risk-weighted assets in the bank's portfolio. However, these
risk categories are very crude and they are very limited in number. Since the reg-
ulator can only see the aggregate values of the risk categories, but not the details,
banks know the risk details within each risk category better than the regulator does.
For instance, all of the commercial loans in the bank's portfolio are assigned a risk
weight of 1, independently of their riskiness. "Regulatory capital arbitrage" (RCA)
is the substitution of riskier assets within a risk category for safer assets, with no
45See Prescott (1997) for a description and Marshall and Venkataraman (1999) for a welfare
analysis of the Pre-commitment approach.
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requirement to increase the risk-based capital.
Bank deposits are fully insured by the regulator. Throughout banks pay a fixed-
rate premium (p) on deposits at the end of each period in return for this insurance.4 6
Risky Assets:
Let banks, on the liability side of the balance sheet, have deposits (Dt) and equity
(Et) and, on the asset side, have the risky assets (At) at a given time t.47 At time
t = 0, the balance sheet of a bank looks like:
Assets Liabilities
Ao Do
Eo
where A0 = Eo + Do. For simplicity, the risk-free rate of return is normalize to 0 in
the model.
Each bank has one category of assets, which can be invested in two different in-
vestment opportunities (subcategories): positive NPV "good loans" and zero NPV
"risky loans." Risky loans can be interpreted in many ways: they may be zero NPV,
high variance loans, or some securitization of assets, or other derivative instruments
that are highly risky. Good loans have higher expected returns than the risky loans,
however, risky loans have a strong upside potential, but are likely to cause bankruptcy
otherwise. Since the deposit insurance pays for the losses in case of bankruptcy, the
risky loans may have higher effective private returns to the banks. The opportu-
46 As stated by Calem and Rob (1999), after 1993, in addition to the fixed insurance premium,
undercapitalized banks are asked to pay an extra premium based on capital ratios and risk-weighted
assets. However, banks in this model are assumed to be at least adequately capitalized, since
incorporating the possiblility of undercapitalization does not add to the scope of the paper.
4 7The asset side of the balance sheet could include mandatory reserves (Ct), which include cash
or liquid assets that have risk-free returns. This would only add a constant to our equations, and
would not change any of the results. Therefore, for simplicity, I assume that this term is zero.
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nity cost of this put option, created by deposit insurance, is the possible loss of the
continuation value of the bank.
Good loans have a random gross return, rL,t, with a mean of L and a small
variance of aL, while risky loans have a random gross return, r,t, with a mean of 7M
and a relatively higher variance of au. Note that TL is larger than the gross risk-free
rate and M is equal to the gross risk-free rate. Hence, good loans are not risk-free,
but their variance is much less than the variance of the risky loans.
Banks invest 3t of the total value in good loans and 1 - t in risky loans. Let rt
be the period t gross return on the total investment. Thus,
rt = /trL,t + (1 - /3t)rM,t. (1)
Let the sequences of returns, rL,1, rL,2,. . , rL,T and rM,1, rM,2,... , rM,T be iid,
normally distributed and independent.4 8 Short selling of bank assets is not possible,
i.e., 0 < 3t < 1, since the regulator can observe negative /Ot. Moreover, in the
presence of the deposit insurance guarantee, short selling can increase the risky asset
size without limit, allowing the banks to take an infinite amount of risk. (See Gan
(2004) for an analysis of banks' risk taking behavior if there is no limit on their size.)
Given that rL,t N(YL,U 2 ) and rM,t N(TM, o2) are independent, rt is also
normally distributed with mean r,t and variance a2 wheregr
tr,t = /3tTL + (1 - /3t)TM (2)
4 8 Although empirical tests show that returns have fatter tails than implied by normal distribution,
the normality assumption is best suited to the additive nature of the problem. Besides, rL can be
viewed as a convex combination of N independent safe investment returns for some large N. Then
even if each rL,i can be lognormal, the Central Limit Theorem implies that the distribution of
N
rL = rL,iai converges to a normal distribution.
i=1
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and
or2t = taL + (1 - t)2 (3)
Capital Requirement:
The risk weight of the asset category is assumed to be 1. Note that the risk
weight on the commercial loan category is also 1 in the current system. The capital
requirement function, f(Ao), under the current fixed-rate (k) capital requirements is
f(Ao) = kAo. (4)
Thus,
Eo > kAo (5)
is required for a bank to be adequately capitalized.4 9
* Asset Size:
Bank size is assumed to be fixed across time. The bank holds the amount invested
in risky assets (A0 ) constant over time by distributing the profits to shareholders as
dividends. In case of a loss without bankruptcy, the initial shareholders are assumed
to subsidize the bank with new capital equal to the loss, and therefore equity is always
equal to the initial amount E0 while the asset size is equal to A0 . The model assumes
the threshold closing rule. Hence, in case of a bankruptcy (if Aort < Do), the deposit
insurer takes over the firm without giving shareholders the option to recapitalize. As
discussed in Pelizzon (2001), if shareholders have an option to recapitalize in case of
bankruptcy, the probability of bankruptcy will increase because the shareholders will
invest in a riskier way, with the supposition that they would put more money in if
something unexpectedly bad were to happen.50
49k = 8% under the current capital regulations.
50°In the model, I assume that the threshold for the bankruptcy is zero amount of equity. This
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Holding equity fixed at Eo also creates an upper bound for the amount of deposits,
Do. Therefore Do is also constant over time at an amount equal to the maximum
allowed by the capital requirements. 51 Since deposits are riskless assets, their gross
return is 1. Then, the amount of dividend distributed at the end of each period is
f0, Aort < Do (6)Divt= , (6)
(rt - 1)Ao - pDo, otherwise
where rt is the gross return on risky assets, as defined in Eq. (1) and p is the fixed-rate
premium per deposits for the deposit insurance.
2.3.2 Banks
* Value Function of Banks:
Risk-neutral shareholders will have managers maximize the total dividend received
by the shareholders. At a given period t,
max E dDivt+r
{ -=1 }
where d is the probability that the next period will not be the last period of the
bank. Note that this probability is constant since At is fixed for all t and rt is an iid
process. 2
Since the investment size is assumed to be fixed across time, the bank faces the
threshold could be changed to any other positive or negative value without altering the results and
the conclusions. Moreover, endogeneizing the optimal threshold choice for the equity holders would
not change my results either as long as this choice is kept constant over all t, for the model to be
technically solvable.
51See Stein (1998) for an adverse selection model, in which banks prefer to raise funds through
insured deposits rather than equity due to information problems.
52 The probability of continuation, d, should not be viewed as an interest-rate discount factor.
Indeed, we normalized the gross risk-free return to be 1. By incorporating the probability of having
the end-period, we implicitly assumed that the bank has a random lifetime (< oc w.p. 1.) instead of
an infinite one. This assumption is realistic since we cannot expect a bank to survive for an infinite
period.
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same static problem each period; therefore, the value of the bank and the amount of
investment in the good loans, 3, as well as the mean and variance of the gross return
on assets (or and or), should be constant over time. Thus, with the optimum choice
of 3, the value of the bank equity at any given period is
00A
V() = E EdT(Divt+T) (7)
dPr(Aort+l > Do) [E((rt+l - 1)Ao-pDo Aort+l > Do) + V(3)] 
From the Appendix A, the solution for the above problem is given by:
V(3) = (1 -df(3))-d [g(3) + f(3) ((/r -1)Ao -pDo)] (8)
where
f(3) - [t AO- Do] (9)
and
g() = Ao r exp 2(Do ] (10)
Note that 1 -- f(3) is the probability of bankruptcy. Without loss of generality I
assume that the capital requirement is binding for the bank.53 Hence,
Eo = kAo X Do = (1- k)Ao
This allows us to rewrite (8) as
V(/3) = (1 -df ())-ld [g(3) + f(3)(,Ur - 1 -p(l - k))Ao] (11)
53 Holding the asset size fixed, the value of the bank is a decreasing function of its capital re-
quirement k. (See the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 below.) Thus, in equilibrium, the capital
requirements bind, and banks do not hold cushion capital.
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where
f() =[(k +/r)1] (12)
and
g(3) = A 0 r exp (I( + ))2 (13)
This can be solved numerically for 3* = argmax V(3). (See Appendix C.) Figure
2.1 shows how V(3) changes as 3 and ar2 change. Note that, when the variance
of the risky loan (2) is equal to the variance of the safe loan, the bank optimally
sets 3* = 1. That is because the expected return on the safe loan is higher than
the expected return on the risky loan while their variances are the same. However,
holding other parameters constant, as the variance of the risky loan increase, 3*
changes from 1 to 0 since the put option value due to the deposit insurance exceeds
the continuation (franchise) value of the bank.
* Types of Banks:
There are two types of banks in this model. "G" banks always invest all their
assets in good loans (set 3 = 1) in order to reduce the probability of bankruptcy and
preserve their franchise value. "B" banks do not have the opportunity to invest in
good loans, or are better off exploiting the deposit insurance as much as possible, and
they always invest all their assets in highly risky loans (set 3 = 0). Notice that if both
safe and risky investment opportunities are available to all the banks, "G" and "B"
types of banks are endogenously determined in the model. Because of the convexity of
their value function, banks optimally choose corner solutions: a "G" bank, for which
continuation value of the bank is more important than the put option value created
by the deposit insurance optimally sets 3 = 1 while a "B" bank sets 3 = 0 valuing
the put option value, and, therefore, asset return variance more than the continuation
value of the bank. Note that these banks could also differ in their quality of lending
as well as their potential lending opportunities. Some banks earn relatively more
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on their portfolios due to better monitoring and risk management techniques, better
client relationships, better ability to use soft/hard information, or any other expertise
unique to them.
Figure 2.2 illustrates numerical simulations for G and B banks. Holding other pa-
rameters fixed, for instance, a 2% difference in expected return on safe loans (3.75%
vs. 1.75%) makes the same bank shift from safe investment ( = 1) to risky invest-
ment ( = 0).
The value of the B bank is
V(/= 0,k)= 1-d (-) d AO exp( 2 ) (-) ( 1- k)PAO](k ]-1 [ A0 _ (k)2 /l pam v~xP2- - ~ 2M -- am
(14)
and the value of the G bank is
d [AO L exp -(1-(k+L)) ]+ ((k+TL) (L 1 -p( -k))Ao
V(- = 1,k) = -L I kLJ 
[1 - d (k+L) l
(15)
Suppose G banks constitute a fraction, sG, while B banks constitute a fraction,
sB, of the population. The regulator knows these fractions in the economy and if
bankrupt banks are continuously replaced by other banks of the same type, these
fractions are, on average, constant across time. Banks are assumed to be symmetric
within types with fixed investment in loans, A0 , each period. For the given capital
requirement ratio, the probabilities of bankruptcy for the G banks and the B banks
are, respectively,
PG =(1- fG(/))= 1 ( (k + TrL)) (16)
grL
and
PB = (1 -f(/)) =b (a . (17)
Thus, PG < PB.
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2.3.3 The Regulator
In addition o providing deposit insurance to protect small depositors and prevent
bank runs, the regulator's main objectives are as follows54:
* Maximize the productive capacity of the economy, by making sure that entre-
preneurs with good projects will be able to find funding through G banks.
* Enforce a policy function determining capital requirements for the banks in
order to prevent bankruptcies and their consequent deadweight losses. This
leads to a goal of setting capital requirements at a level which would, given the
fixed-rate deposit insurance premiums, covers the expected loss to the regulator
in case of default.
The regulator could ensure the solvency of the banks by making them invest only
in risk-free securities, but this is socially undesirable since the primary function of
a bank, as an intermediary between the lenders and the borrowers, is to provide
funding to entrepreneurs with good projects. The flow of entrepreneurial positive
NPV project ideas in the economy requires loans from the banks in order to start
these projects. Let yt represent the net return for entrepreneurs on borrowing from
G banks. The first objective of the regulator is to maximize the expected value of
the following social welfare function at each time period t:
SWt = sG(yt + rt l),t - (18)kG
where SWt constitutes the NPV of the investment in good loans during the time
period t from both the banks' and entrepreneurs' perspectives. The second objective
5 4 Although in the U.S. there exist multiple regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC), this paper assumes that all the banking regulation and supervision is done by a single
regulator. Separating the functions of the regulator in the model would not add any insight, but
only complication.
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of the regulator is to set the capital requirement such that, given the fixed-rate deposit
insurance premiums, the expected value of providing deposit insurance is at least equal
to zero:
E(InsurancePremium - Loss') > 0, i E G,B. (19)
Note that; if the regulator has lexicographic preference for maximizing the social
welfare function, SWt, it might be optimal to set the capital requirement for the G
banks such that the expected loss to the deposit insurance fund is in fact less than zero.
That is because SWt is a decreasing function of kG. But, remember that, although
not large, the probability of bankruptcy for the G banks (PG as in (16)) is positive.
Therefore, if we consider the deadweight losses in case of bankruptcy of G banks
as well as decreasing returns to the investment in good loans for the entrepreneurs
= cln , where c is a constant), the amount of optimal expected loss to the
regulator of providing the deposit insurance to the G banks will be endogenously
determined.5 5 For simplicity, I assume that the regulator sets the capital requirement
for the G banks such that its expected loss of providing deposit insurance is equal to
zero. This might be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium assumption, where marginal
return on good loans is expected to be zero.
E(InsurancePremium- Loss') = 0 would imply the following constraints on the
capital requirements of the G and the B banks (see Appendix A.2 for their derivation).
p(1-kG)(k>G±L1 [1L ] - exp [(= 0 (20)
p(l - k )+ k [ ] U exp = ] 0 (21)
55If the good loans in the economy is in limited supply, then net return to the G bank, rL,t - 1,
would also be decreasing in total size of the assetso.would also be decreasing in total size of the assets, k-r.
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where kG and kB are the amounts of capital that make the deposit insurance system
break even in case of default within that time period for the G and the B banks,
respectively, and p is the fixed-rate deposit insurance premium paid by the banks on
insured deposits. In other words, kG and kB are the first-best values of the capital
requirement for the two types of banks in this model. Figure 2.3 plots equations (20)
and (21). Note that kB is significantly larger than kG.
Capital requirements create an upper bound on the asset size of the banks. First-
best values for the maximum allowable sizes of the G banks and B banks are
A G EO (22)
and
A B Eo (23)
where A G > AB . Note that, holding equity fixed, the sizes of the banks decrease as
their capital requirements increase.
2.3.4 Pooling Equilibrium
Under asymmetric information, first-best values of the capital requirements are not
feasible because B banks have an incentive to act as if they were G banks. Since
the regulator cannot differentiate good banks from bad banks and only knows their
fractions in the economy, as in the current fixed-rate capital requirement system, the
regulator sets the required amount of capital for each bank (or asset category) equal
to
k* = Gk + Bk, (24)
where kG < k* < kB and WG and WB are the weights. These weights are functions of
sG and s B , and they also depend on the demand for the good loans in the economy
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and the relative probability and costs of bankruptcy for G and B banks.56
Proposition 1 If the regulator cannot differentiate B banks from G banks, B banks
always pool with G banks in order to have the fixed-rate (k*) capital requirement.
Proof. See Appendix B.1. 
The current regulations make the B banks better off by reducing the required
amount of capital for them and consequently increasing the upper bound on their
sizes while making the G banks worse off by increasing their capital requirement and
shrinking their sizes. Since the reduction in the upper bound on the sizes of the G
banks reduces loans to good entrepreneurs, and the increase in the size of B banks
means higher probable bankruptcy costs, the economy is worse off in the presence of
the information asymmetry between the banks and the regulator.
Corollary 2 The social welfare function is expected to decrease as the economy switches
from the first-best capital requirements to the pooling equilibrium capital requirement,
k*.
Proof. See Appendix B.2. 
As the capital requirement for the G banks increases, holding equity constant,
their sizes, and hence, good loans to entrepreneurs, decrease. Therefore, E(SWt)
decreases under the pooling equilibrium.
Moreover, under the pooling equilibrium,
56 While setting the capital requirement under asymmetric information, the regulator also considers
the tradeoff between minimizing the deadweight costs in case of bankruptcy of the G or B banks
and maximizing the expected social welfare function, E(SWt), by increasing the size of the good
loans. If the only aim of the regulator were to make the deposit insurance fund on average break
even, then the capital requirement, k*, would be determined by the following equality.
(--[a4,( - ___T 2___ B kBI, k*) mex (k) 2~ -
p(l-k*)+s[> (c vLL -- exp( 22 ] + [k ( -- exp 
where a = k* + TL -1.
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E(InsurancePremium B - LossB ) < 0,
which implies that the expected value of providing deposit insurance to the B banks
is, on average, less than zero. In other words, if both types of banks are subject to
the same capital requirement, k*, the condition to satisfy a prime objective of the
regulator - to set expected value of providing deposit insurance to B banks equal to
at least zero - never holds. That is because, holding equity constant, A0 is a declining
function of k and
d(PB) = 1(1 - fB()) = _ < 0,
where PB is the probability of bankruptcy for the B banks.
In other words, due to the decrease in their capital requirement, both the sizes and
the bankruptcy probabilities of the B banks increase under the pooling equilibrium.
On the other hand, the increase in capital requirement from kG to k* for the G banks
reduce their probability of bankruptcy, making the expected value of providing deposit
insurance to the safe banks positive for the regulator. However, when compared to
the increase in the probability of bankruptcy for B banks, this effect is minor since
G banks already have a much lower probability of going bankrupt compared to the
B banks (see equations (16) and (17) above). Therefore, expected losses due to
bankruptcy increase in the pooling equilibrium.
To sum up, the current system creates an inefficient pooling equilibrium where
G and B banks are exposed to the same capital requirement, decreasing the sizes of
the safe banks while increasing both the sizes and the bankruptcy probabilities of the
risky banks in the economy.
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2.4 BASEL II
The new Capital Accord, Basel II, is an attempt to be more effective in regulating
banks' risky investments. A major change proposed by Basel II regulations is the
introduction of an option for banks to choose between two approaches in calculating
their asset risk.5 7 These two options, the "Standardized Approach" and the "Internal
Ratings-based (IRB) Approach," are already described in the introduction. If a bank
chooses to use the IRB Approach and if this decision is approved by the supervisors
after some examination, the regulatory capital that it has to hold against a credit
exposure will be determined by a function of the credit risk of this exposure. Under
this approach, a bank's internal risk measurement systems will assign probabilities
of default (PDs) for the risky assets. Moreover, the risk assessments by the bank
will also include the loss given (LGD) and the exposure at default (EAD). Based on
these estimates, the regulator enforces the capital requirement function that will set
the regulatory capital for the bank.58 Jackson (2002) gives a simplified version of the
capital requirement functions as follows:
kIRB = LGD x [ -(PD) + pl/2-(C) AD, (25)
5 7There are three pillars of Basel II: capital adequacy requirements, supervisory review, and
market discipline. This model does not incorporate the third pillar since it is not related to the
regulatory arbitrage problem. See Decamps, Rochet, and Roger (2004) for a continuous-time model
of market discipline and its effects on banks' behavior and capital requirements. Moreover, this
chapter concentrates on the Accord as prepared by the Basel Committee of the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS). See Gordy(2003) for its theoretical foundations. Different countries could be
implementing it with their own modifications. In a later section, the U.S. case will be discussed in
detail.
58 In fact, there are two variants of IRB; one is the "Advanced IRB Approach" that was already
introduced. Second one is the "Foundation IRB Approach", where the bank determines only the
probablity of default (PD) for the risky assets, and the regulator determines other parameters (LGD,
EAD) as well as the capital requirement function. For this paper's purpose, there is no need to
differentiate between these two approaches, Therefore, I will use the word "IRB approach", refering
to any of the two. LGD measures the proportion of exposure that will be lost if a default occurs;
EAD for loan commitments measures the amount of the facility that is likely to be drawn if a default
occurs.
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where is the normal distribution cdf, C is the confidence interval, and p is the
asset correlation that is set by the supervisory committee. (See Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2003) for the capital requirement function, including maturity
of the exposure and the formula defining p.)59
Switching to the IRB approach will be costly for the banks because of the high
costs of setting up a sound internal risk assessment infrastructure that can be ap-
proved by the regulator. The criteria for getting this approval are quite demanding.
As explained in Gallati (2003), the bank must have a sufficient number of staff fa-
miliar with complex models not only in the area of trading, but also risk control,
internal auditing, and back office functions. The bank must also possess an adequate
electronic data processing infrastructure. The following quotation is from Financial
Times of March 2, 2004, with the title "HSBC spells out cost of global regulation,"
representative of the banks' complaints about these high set-up costs:
HSBC has become the first bank to spell out the mounting cost of
regulation round the world, saying that compliance with different rules
and regimes cost it about $400m last year. HSBC, which operates in 79
countries and is overseen by about 370 regulators, expects the burden
to rise as new regulations, such as Basel II rules on bank capital, come
into force...The Basel II rules will require banks to invest heavily in new
systems for assessing credit and operational risk before 2007...
Another essential feature of the IRB approach is the "back-testing" by the su-
pervisors. Based on the past years' observations, supervisors check the accuracy
of the estimates reported by the banks. However, Ward (2002a) argues that rely-
ing on banks' risk estimates is not incentive-compatible unless those risk estimates
59 A similar formula to determine capital requirement due to market risk is the following: kIRBket 
3VaR+constant, where VaR is the statistical measure Value-at-Risk, which gives the maximum loss
that can occur over a given time period, at a given confidence interval, due to exposure to market
risk. The IRB Approach for market risk was introduced in the 1997 amendment to the current
Accord, and the proposed Basel II rules extend this approach to credit and operational risks.
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are backed up by other safety measures that penalize excessive risk taking since the
back-tests by supervisors do not have the power to distinguish good risk estimat-
ing models from bad ones, banks have incentives to manipulate the models to have
lower risk estimates, and securitization will again be rewarded. Moreover, as pointed
out by Rochet (1999), the practical implementation of risk models raises concerns
as well. For instance, all possible estimation methods (e.g., historical simulations,
first-order Gaussian approximations, or Monte Carlo or bootstrap methods) have
some drawbacks: the stationary assumption of historical simulations is empirically
rejected; returns empirically have fatter tails than their Gaussian approximations;
etc.60 Danielsson et al. (2001), criticizing the Basel II Accord, also emphasizes that
statistical models used for forecasting risk have been proven to give inconsistent and
biased forecasts, and their performance is very sensitive to the specification of pa-
rameters such as estimation horizon. Therefore, when internal models are used to
determine capital requirements, banks will have incentives to manipulate the internal
risk assessment models to have lower risk estimates, and risk shifting will again be
rewarded.
2.4.1 Basel II Model Set-up and Assumptions
We have the same setup as before; however, banks now have an option to choose
from the old system of fixed-rate capital requirement (k*) and their own internal
risk assessment system (only after getting approval from the supervisor) in order to
determine how much capital to hold. Main characteristics of the model are listed
below.
* Capital Requirements under the IRB Approach:
Under the IRB approach, the regulator sets the capital requirement, kIRB, based
on the risk estimates produced by the banks' internal risk assessment models. For the
6 0See also Kupiec and O'Brien (1995a) for a review and critique of the internal models approach.
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G banks, this capital requirement, kRB, would be equal to kG, which is the amount
of capital that makes expected loss to the regulator providing deposit insurance equal
to zero (as defined in equation (20)). If kG were higher than kRB, the regulator
would like to enforce kG; on the other hand, if it were lower, the bank would prefer
to report kG instead.61 Thus, G banks will enjoy a lower capital requirement than
the pooling equilibrium capital requirement, k*, if they adopt the IRB approach.
For a B bank, the IRB approach would require a higher capital requirement (for
instance kB, as defined in equation (21)) than the one in the standardized approach.
Note that since a similar information asymmetry between the banks and the regulator
still exists under the IRB approach and back-tests do not work efficiently, any B bank
can has incentives to switch to the IRB approach in order to pretend to be a G bank,
with its lower capital requirements and higher size.
Supervision under the IRB Approach:
Banks that choose to use their internal risk models will be under close supervision.
We assume that there exists some probability 0 that any B bank, switching to the
IRB approach and pretending to be a G bank will be caught misreporting own risk
estimates by the regulator. When such a bank is caught, it will be penalized to have
kB as the capital requirement for all periods afterwards.62
In addition, like a G bank, a B bank will have to pay a per unit asset size of cs
when it is subject to supervision.
6 1It is worth mentioning again that kG is the upper bound on the capital requirement that the G
banks will be obliged to hold. Given that, holding the size of the equity constant, the social welfare
function is decreasing in kG, it might not be optimal for the regulator to set the capital requirement
such that deposit insurance system breaks even. The optimal capital ratio will be determined by
the trade-off between the deadweight cost due to bankruptcy of G banks and the marginal increase
in social welfare function due to increase in size of the G banks.
62 As the ratio of capital to deposits increases, the incentives of the shareholders to gamble decrease.
Therefore, the increase in the capital requirement to the first-best level can make some B banks
switch to investing safely if they have alternative safer investment opportunities. Moreover, this
model simply concentrates on only a single asset-risk category, and there might be some other safe
investments of the banks that correspond to some other asset-risk categories. That is because the
regulator is not better off closing the B banks as they are caught.
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* Set-up Costs under the IRB Approach:
A reasonable assumption for the set-up costs for the IRB approach is that they
will be much higher for B banks than G banks. Since G banks might already have
these risk measurement systems or similar ones set up in order to be able to choose
more prudent investments, their set- up costs under the IRB approach are less than
those for B banks. One can also argue that since the average life-time of a G bank is
much longer than a B bank because of the difference in their respective bankruptcy
probabilities, this set-up cost per year within the life-time is much smaller for the G
banks than for the B banks. Formally, the fixed set-up cost is CF for the B banks, is
CF for the G types and CF << CF. For simplicity, CG = 0 in the analyses.
Proposition 3 Every G bank will adopt the "IRB approach," and will hold their
first-best capital amount, kG.
Proof. See Appendix B.3. 
The G banks are always better off identifying themselves to the regulator by
adopting the IRB approach, so that they can hold less capital.
Corollary 4 Neither a pooling equilibrium, in which both types of banks choose to
continue using the "Standardized approach," nor a separating equilibrium, in which
G banks choose to continue using the "Standardized approach" and B banks adopt the
"IRB approach, " are possible.
Proof. Following Proposition 3, since G banks will always switch to the IRB ap-
proach, the proof of the corollary is trivial. 
The decision of B banks depends on the relative benefits and costs of switching
to the IRB approach. Will B banks always have an incentive to switch to the new
system? The next section will address this question.
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2.4.2 Separating Equilibrium Under Basel II
Given that all the G banks will adopt the IRB approach, B banks have two alterna-
tives: either stay in the old system and identify themselves to the regulator or try to
adopt the IRB approach and pretend to be G banks. The capital requirement in the
standardized approach, k*, is higher now because all the banks that stay out of the
IRB approach will be B banks. The regulator will increase k* to kB, which sets the
expected loss to the regulator from providing deposit insurance to the B banks equal
to zero.
A separating equilibrium, in which B banks stay in the standardized approach and
are required to hold kB amount of capital while G banks switch to the IRB approach
is possible if the probability of being caught (0) or the cost of switching to the IRB
approach (Cr) is high enough:
VIRB(3 = O, kG, CB) - CB < V(3 = O, kB), (26)
where VIRB(,3 = 0, kG, CSB) is the value of the B bank, pretending to be a G bank
under the IRB approach, with k=kG and supervision cost, CB; CFB are the fixed set-
up costs; and V(/ = 0, kB) is the value of the B bank, as given in equation (14) with
k = kB in the old standardized system. It can be shown that VIRB (/ = O, kG, CsB ) is
equal to
d [E-9-2 exp ( -kG)2] + (kG ) [0V(/: 0, kB) - (c8 + (1- kG)p) ]]
[(1 - d(1 - )4 (kG )
See Appendix A.3 for the derivation.
However, inequality (26) is unlikely to hold because, given the criticisms of the
efficiency of supervision and back-testing, is not expected to be very high. For
0 < 1, B banks will switch to the IRB regime with its lower capital requirements
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by pretending to be a G bank, as long as the set-up costs are not sufficiently high.
This incentive is also driven by the fact that the required capital ratio in the old
standardized approach (kB) is the same as the penalty capital ratio that the B bank
would be obliged to hold if caught. Hence, the following inequality holds if CF or 0
is sufficiently low:
VIRB( = 0, kG, CS) - C > V(, = 0, kB). (28)
Therefore, it is not in the interest of the regulator to increase the capital require-
ment for the standardized approach up to kB since the aim of the regulator is the
separation of G banks from B banks so that G banks' sizes and consequently good
loans going to the entrepreneurs are not rationed. On the other hand, the goal of the
regulator is to set the capital requirement for the B banks as high as possible so as to
both reduce the costs in case of bankruptcy and induce a switch to safe investment by
them. Because the first-best values of capital requirements are not possible to enforce
by making all types of banks switch to the IRB approach, the regulator would prefer
giving some incentives to B banks in order to prevent the IRB approach from being
an inefficient pooling equilibrium.
If there exists a knew that is higher than the current capital requirement (k*) but
lower than the first-best for the B banks (kB), such that for the given CS and 0, a
B bank is made indifferent between trying to adopt the IRB approach and staying
in the old system, the regulator can sustain a separating equilibrium by setting the
capital requirement for the standardized approach less than k*ew. Proposition 5 below
defines this separating equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Given the supervision and set-up costs for the banks and the proba-
bility of being caught as a B bank pretending to a G bank under the IRB approach,
there exists a knw such that the following separating equilibrium exists:
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1. G banks switch to the IRB approach, and their capital requirement is kG.
2. B banks stay in the old system of the standardized approach and their capital
requirement will be k*ew - e, where kG < k w < kB and the following equation
is satisfied.
VIRB(3 = 0, k, C) -CF = V(3 = 0, knew).
Proof. See Appendix B.4. 
The following corollary shows that, compared to the current system, the regulator
will be better off if the separating equilibrium, in which both G and B banks are
identified by the regulator and G banks are rewarded with the decrease in their
capital requirements, can be sustained.63
Corollary 6 Compared to the pooling equilibrium under the standardized approach
(as described in Proposition 1), the separating equilibrium, in which all the G banks
adopt the IRB approach and all the B banks stay in the standardized approach (as
described in Proposition 3), increases the social welfare function.
Proof. See Appendix B.5. 
The corollary states that social welfare is maximized because the sizes of the safe
banks, and consequently the sizes of the good loans to the entrepreneurs, increase
when the G banks adopt the IRB approach.
63A reasonable question to ask here is why the regulator does not wait for a few periods and
identify the B banks, and then close them. There are a few answers to this question. First, among
the B type banks, there might be some BG types, which could create safe investment opportunities
for themselves and for which a high enough increase in capital requirements might cause their
investment decision to shift to these safe assets. If k*ew > k*, these BG types might start investing
safely because as the share of their own capital within the portfolio, which can be lost, increases, their
incentives to gamble decrease. As stated in Furlong and Keeley (1989), low levels of capital increase
banks' incentives to take risks and this is one of the main motives for the capital adequacy regulation.
Second, there exists continuous replacement of bankrupt firms; in other words, each period there
could be some new B banks entering the economy. Thus, such a penalty would destroy the separating
equilibrium for the incoming B banks. Third, this is a very simplified model of regulatory capital
arbitrage, concentrating only in a single asset-risk category. There could be some other investments
of the same bank belonging to the risk-free category or other types of safe investments.
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On the other hand, one of the main objectives of the regulator is to set the capital
requirements such that the expected loss of providing the deposit insurance is at
least equal to zero. In the pooling equilibrium under both the IRB approach and the
standardized approach, this constraint is not satisfied for the B banks since they are
required to hold less capital than the first-best value. In this way, the sizes and, more
importantly, the probability of bankruptcy of the B banks become larger than they
should be. Therefore, the increase in capital requirements for the B banks under the
separating equilibrium of Basel II will better align the regulatory capital of the B
banks with their true portfolio risks and reduce the probability of default as well as
the loss given default.
This statement is true only under certain conditions, though. Since, with proba-
bility 0, B banks are caught misreporting the risk estimates under the IRB approach
and thereafter penalized by being obliged to hold their first-best capital requirements,
the regulator will be better off by giving incentives (ke - instead of kB) to the
B banks to stay in the standardized approach only if 0 is not high enough. More-
over, when compared to the pooling equilibrium under the standardized approach,
the regulator will certainly be better off under the Basel II separating equilibrium if
knew -e > k*. However, if kew - < k*, in order to conclude that the regulator would
still be better off, we need to show that the increase in the social welfare function due
to increase in sizes of the G banks is larger than the decrease in value due to increase
in the sizes and bankruptcy probabilities of the B banks when they have k*w -
instead of k* as the capital requirement.
Using the IRB approach would also be a better way for G banks to align regulatory
measures of risk with the true economic risks of their portfolio. Securitization and
credit derivatives could be used for diversification of portfolio risk and reducing the
costs of debt financing. In other words, these instruments can be used to reduce
underlying economic risk instead of exploiting deposit insurance, as long as they are
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within efficiency limits. Therefore, it is good to separate the banks that use risky
instruments within efficiency limits from banks that use them in order to create
discrepancies between economic risk and its regulatory measure.
The empirical question is whether the Basel II separating equilibrium described
in Proposition 3 can be sustained for reasonable values of the probability of being
caught (0) and the sunk-cost of switching to IRB for B banks (CF). In the numerical
simulations, kew > k* exists only for really high values of CB or 0. Given the set-
up cost, differences between G and B banks should be sufficiently observable and the
back-testing and supervision must sufficiently be efficient. This is the main regulatory
challenge.
2.4.3 Implementation of Basel II Rules in the U.S.
Although the U.S. is the most influential member of the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision, the implementation of the Basel II rules in the U.S. will be slightly
different from the proposed Accord. (See, for instance, Hannan and Pilloff (2004) for
discussion and references, and, for an overview, the "U.S. Implementation of Basel
II: An Overview (2003).") According to the current proposal, banks of at least $250
billion asset size or of at least $10 billion on-balance-sheet foreign exposure will be
obliged to adopt the IRB approach (in fact, the Advanced IRB approach; see footnote
58 for the definition). These criteria include about the ten largest banking firms in
the U.S. Other banks will be given the option to switch to the IRB approach as long
as they have sound enough risk assessment infrastructures. The ten or so largest
banks and also the ones that later become eligible to adopt the IRB approach will,
most probably, be subject to lower capital requirements than under the standardized
approach. Among the objectives of the revisions to the Basel Accord are listed the
following: "develop a measure of capital that is more risk sensitive than the cur-
rent approach and better suited to the complex activities of the international banks"
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and also "encourage improvements in risk management and enhance internal assess-
ments of capital adequacy." (See the "U.S. Implementation of Basel II: An Overview
(2003).") The banks that are obliged to adopt the IRB approach might have been
chosen by using their sizes and foreign exposures as indicators of their prudence. How-
ever, a more important reason could be that, as expressed by the regulators, these
banks form the core of the financial stability in the U.S., and making them invest in
their risk measurement systems is therefore essential.
Within the U.S. implementation of the Basel II, the model set-up of this chapter
is more applicable to all U.S. banks excluding the ten or so largest banks because
in the model, all banks are assumed to have an option to stay in the standardized
approach. However, the model can be easily modified such that the regulator might
use some exogenous factors such as banks' asset sizes as indicators of the prudence of
their investments. Such a modification will not alter the conclusions of this chapter
since, in the current model, these largest banks are expected to be investing safely
and switching to the IRB approach due to their very high continuation value.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter contributes to the ongoing discussions about the Basel II Accord, and its
model provides some empirical predictions which can be tested after the implementa-
tion of these new rules. In particular, this study provides an understanding of banks'
risk-shifting incentives, derived from the divergences between true economic risks and
their regulatory counterparts, under the current capital regulations. These incentives
create an inefficient pooling equilibrium, in which banks investing in an unduly risky
way pretend to be investing safely in order to have a lower capital requirement. The
chapter examines whether the proposed "Basel II" regulatory system would be more
efficient and effective in dealing with these incentives. The IRB Approach of Basel II
is an attempt to use banks' own internal risk estimates in setting regulatory capital
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requirements. I show that this approach can instead be interpreted as an attempt to
create a separating equilibrium, in which safe banks adopt the IRB approach while
the banks that do not invest prudently stay with the old standardized approach. This
will be a signaling equilibrium, in which
* by choosing to use their own internal risk assessment systems, safe banks identify
themselves to the regulator and are rewarded by a lower capital requirement
than the one in the pooling equilibrium;
* banks that do not invest prudently will have some incentives to stay in the old
system instead of using their own internal risk assessment models and pretend-
ing to be safe banks because adopting the IRB approach creates high set-up
and supervision costs for them;
* and the regulator might be better off setting the capital requirement of the
standardized approach to be less than the first-best capital ratios of risky banks
in order to give them enough incentives to stay in the standardized approach.
In interpreting the changes coming with Basel II, the objective of the regulator
while implementing the new rules is critical. If the regulator's only aim is to make
all the banks invest in their risk assessment systems, then the regulator might aim
to provide incentives to create a pooling equilibrium under the IRB approach for
both safe and risky banks. If, additionally, Basel II attempts to solve the regulatory
capital arbitrage problem of the current capital adequacy rules, the regulator must
create incentives for the risky banks to stay in the standardized approach unless
adopting the RB approach will make them invest more prudently. Under the IRB
approach, risky banks will invest safely only if the supervision system is effective
enough to considerably reduce the information asymmetry between the banks and the
regulator. However, given that the supervision system is not expected to be effective
enough, separating equilibrium can only be sustained by giving some incentives to
106
the excessively risk-taking banks not to opt into the new IRB approach, by setting
their capital requirements in the standardized approach lower than their first-best.
The planned U.S. implementation of Basel II uses the size or foreign exposure
of the banks as the main indicator for their prudence, and obliges the ten or so
largest U.S. banks to adopt the IRB approach. The main reason for this decision
is stated as o make these banks improve their risk assessment systems since these
banks constitute the core of the U.S. banking system. However, what about the
rest of the banks? Will the implementation of Basel II in the U.S. be effective in
preventing risk-shifting incentives of the banks other than the largest ten or so? Will
the set-up costs for the required infrastructure to meet the criteria of the supervisors
be low enough for the smaller-sized but prudent banks that they can adopt the IRB
approach instead of staying in the inefficient pooling equilibrium of the standardized
approach? We must wait for the implementation of Basel II to be able to empirically
answer these questions.
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2.6 Appendix A
2.6.1 Appendix A.1: Derivation of V(3), Value of the Bank
r=00= E E
w=l
(Divt+r) }
0G
=- E dDivt+l + EdT-(Divt+,)I ~~~,r2I
V(3)
= dPr(Aort+l > Do)[E[(rt+ - 1)Ao-pDo Aort+i > Do] + V(3)],
where
Pr [Aort+l > Do] = Pr [rt+l- Pr >
p rAo -Do
AO0ar
E [Ao(rt+ - 1) Aort+l > Do] = E[Ao(rt+l - y,)IAo(rt+l - r) > Do - rAo)]+(pr-l)Ao-pDo.
Let z = Ao(rt+l- Pr). Since rt+ I N(,pr, ar2) and z - N(O, o2) where 2 = Ao2
E [Ao(rt+l - 1) Aort+l > Do] zexp []
a xp --(DO-IrA)2]
- o= I [ 2x 2]
a yrAo-DoAo rAOr IAO'7 exp [( o -/rAo)2o]
L AO 'r jAo/r exp [D2Aa2 ]
4 [ rA-DoL Ar I
(r - 1)Ao - pDo+ (r -1)Ao -pDo
.+ (r- 1)Ao -pDo
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and
Do- Aopr 1
AOUr
V(3)
Thus,
AoarV(3) = d exp
VO)= 77,2w7
[-(Do - rAo) 2 1
L 2A 20 2
d1I PrAo -D] [V(:) + (r - 1)Ao - pDo]
If
r r
and g(/) = orA0 2 exp [-(Do-/ rA ) 2 12A2go2 ]
then the value of the bank will be
V(3) = (1 - df (3))-1 d [g(3) + f (3)(M, - 1)Ao - pDol
and the maximum is found at * where
V(/*) = max { (1- df (3))- 1d [g() + f (/3)(i - 1)Ao - pDol]}
2.6.2 Appendix A.2: Derivation of kG and kB, First-Best Values for the
Capital Requirements
Given the fixed-rate (p) insurance premiums, the first-best values are obtained by
setting the expected loss of providing deposit insurance equal to zero as follows.
E(InsurancePremium' - Lossi) = 0
pDo + Pr(Defaulti)E(LossilDefault') = 0,
where i {G, B}. For the corresponding parameters of G and B banks,
Pr(Default) = Pr [Aort < Do]
= Pr[rt < 1-k]
= a CD[ I-k - r]
a,
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(29)
where (29) uses the assumption that capital requirements are binding for the banks
(i.e., Eo= kAo).
E(Loss Default) = E [Aort- Do) Aort < Do]
= E [Ao(rt- k- 1)jAort < Ao(1 - k)]
= E [Ao(rt-/r) Ao(rt-br) < A(1 - k-r)]
With a similar derivation to the previous section,
E(LossjDefault) = -
Thus, plugging Do = (1 - k)Ao we get
p(~kG)±(G+ I_1>I [1 - (kG+ L) -(1 - (k + L))]
2a 2 
= 0 (30)
p(l - kB) + kBo [ k]
arm
-M
- - exp
completing the derivation.
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Ao°'rexp [ (1- k- /%, )2]
A/ xp [ cr ]
oD [ -k-yrl
L (r I
+A(, + k- 1).
and hence,
(UL
- exp
27w
[_ (k )22 0 (31)
2.6.3 Appendix A.3: Derivation of VIRB(3 = O,kG,CS), Value of a "B"
Bank under the IRB Approach
The value of a B bank after switching to the IRB approach is
VIRB (3 = , kG, Cs) - E{ Ed (Divt+r)
Tr=j }
= dDivt+l + (1- O)VIRB( = 0, kG, Cs) + V( = OkB)
= dPr [Aort+l + kGAo > Do]
* {E [Ao(rt+ - p- 1)Aort+l + kGAo > Do]
+ (1-0)VIRB(3 = O, kG, Cs) + OV( = O, kB)} . (32)
When the capital requirement is binding, we can rewrite (32) replacing A with Eo
and Do with (1 -k) E
-k)Z-
VIRB (3 = O, kG, Cs) Eo ad kG V [exp( kG)2]
2O/
(1 - ) VIRB(3 = 0, kG, CS) + OV(3 = 0, kB) - (c + P) Eo
With further simplification, we get
VRB ( = o, + (k ) [V(B = 0, kB) - (cs + (-k G)p)k]kG,Cs) =
[(1 - d(1 - ) ( -) ]
2.7 Appendix B
2.7.1 Appendix B.1: Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: If the regulator cannot differentiate B banks from G banks,
B banks always pool with G banks in order to have the fixed-rate (k*)
capital requirement.
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(kG)
+1 1D
U M 
d Ea am exp[ T V2__
Since the regulator can not differentiate B banks from the G banks, the only
way for the B banks to choose a higher capital requirement than k* would be their
voluntary incentive to do so. We can easily show that, given the natural upper bound
that the capital requirement creates on size, the maximized value of the B banks
(V(/* = 0, k)) is a declining function of k.64 Thus,
d (V( = 0, k) < 0, Vk.dk
Let Eo0 be the constant value for the initial amount of equity, k be the required capital
ratio, d be the discount factor, aM be the variance of the return on risky loans, and J
and q be the normal cdf and pdf, respectively. Note that we set p = 0 in this analysis
just for simplicity. The result does not change for p > 0 also. We have
k Eo- 1V(3 = 0,k) = (1 -d4 (_)] d [ M [exp( 2]]
Then V(* = 0, k) is equal to
dEo() exp(-(k()2 -do( )) (-k))
- ~~~+
dE0 exp(~2 ) [dkaM¢(7L) - (k2 + ~) (1 d ( -))]
rk2aM(1 -d ( k ))2
dEoexp( )[2) d .( - (1 2 i) - d ( k))]d~k 2do(1- 1I  
vro7M(- dD ( k ))2
The derivative is negative if the term inside the square brackets in (33) is negative.
64See also Figure 2.4 for the numerical simulations, showing that the value of the B bank is a
declining function of the capital requirement, k.
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Let x = k Then the term in square brackets can be written as(YM
[d ¢( ) ( 1 + 2 (1- ))] - d( -(1+A)(1-d (d )) (34)
= ( +t2) dl + 2()- d (X]
= (1+ ) [dl +X2T ]
L(x)
For the expression (34) to be negative, L(x) should be less than 1. Since L(oo) = 1,
it suffices to show L(X) is monotonic increasing to conclude the proof. Hence,
d L2do(;<)dL(X) = 2 +
> 0,
concluding the proof.
2.7.2 Appendix B.2: Proof of Corollary 2
Corollary 2: Social welfare function is expected to decrease as the economy
switches from the first best capital requirements to the pooling equilibrium
capital requirement, k*.
Social welfare function, in any period t, is defined as
SWt = sa (Yt + rL,t - 1) E
kG'
Then,
d Eodk (E(SWt)) = -sG( + L -1) < ,
where y and L are the expected return on good loans to the entrepreneurs and the
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G banks, respectively.
Since the capital requirement for the G banks increases from kG to k*, social
welfare function decreases under the pooling equilibrium.
2.7.3 Appendix B.3: Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: Every G bank will adopt the "IRB approach," and will
hold their first-best capital amount, k.
We want tlo show that the value of the G banks increases under the IRB approach.
By switching to the IRB approach, G banks will enjoy a decline in their capital
requirements from k* to kG. Since the set-up costs are assumed to be zero for them,
the only cost for the G banks in the IRB approach is the supervision cost, C, which
is by definition very small compared to the value created by a decline in their capital
requirements. Therefore, showing that the value of the G banks is a declining function
of the capital requirement for Vk < k* will conclude the proof.6?
As explained in the proof of proposition 2, the decline in the capital require-
ment affects the value of the safe banks through two channels. First, it increases
their value through increase in asset size. Remember that, holding the equity con-
stant, the amount invested in risky assets (A0 ) is bounded from above by E. Second,
decline in the capital requirement increases the probability of bankruptcy (PG =
1- 4 (k+fL-1)), and consequently decreases the value of the bank. However, the net
(YL
effect on value is positive. Recall that,
d -a [- exp [-(1-(k+(L)) + rL )(YL-- 1)]
V(,3 = 1,k) = I I I
I1 d,Ž ( (k±;L)- 1)
I O~~~fL
Note that we set p = 0 in this analysis just for simplicity, the result is unaffected with
65See also Figure 2.4 for my numerical simulations, showing that the value of the G bank is a
declining function of the capital requirement, k.
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p > O. We would like to prove that
d (V( = 1,k)) < O,Vk < k*.
V(O = 1,k) = Eok-l
daUL'(a)
[1- d(a)] + (L -1) [
A(a)
If we differentiate the value function with respect to the capital requirement, we get
(V(3 = 1),k) E A(a)
k2
k
+ kA'(o)
- V( = 1, k)],
_ dA(a) da
da dk
1 dO (a)[(TL
rUL
- 1) - La + daLa( (a)+ dULq (a)]
[1 - d(a)]2
dq$ (a) 
a [1- d~()]2 [- k + dL (aD (a) + (a))!
L(a)
and (36) follows by simply plugging a = (k+FL)-iand (36) follows by si ply plugging a = OYL
(36)
The derivative (V(3 = 1),k) < 0 if and only if
A'(a)- V(/3 = 1,k) < 0.
We would like to find the region of parameter k for which the above holds. Instead,
we focus on another region, which is in fact a subregion of the original one. Let it be
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Let a = (k+rL)-l Then0(L
1
[1 - d'1(a)] -1
d
dk
where
dA(a)
dk
(35)
=
composed of k such that A'(a) < 0. Note that this condition is not a necessary but
a sufficient condition for d (V(/ = 1, k)) < 0. From (36), an equivalent condition is
dOL (cw (a) + X (a)) < k (37)
Recall that a = [(k + L) - 1/aL and thus both sides of (37) is a function of k. This
non-linear inequality would determine the sub-region, i.e., the value kmin such that
all k > kmin the derivative is negative. Instead of trying to evaluate kmin, we check
whether kG is a part of the region, namely, we check whether kG > kmin. Note that
based on equation (30), the value of kG is determined by the non-linear equation
ao () = (a). (38)
Thus, to check whether (37) holds for k = kG, it suffices to check
2daLe (a) < kG, (39)
where a = (ki+.L-1 We know that (ca) - 0 for the G banks. Thus, for a reasonable
value of kG, d (V(3 = 1),k) < 0 for all k > kG, including the pooling equilibrium
capital requirement, k* > kG.
Therefore, it is always better for the G banks to identify themselves by using the
IRB approach, so that they can hold less capital, which is equal to their first-best
ratio (kG), and consequently can increase their size.
2.7.4 Appendix B.4: Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5: Given the supervision and set-up costs for the banks and
the probability of being caught as a B bank pretending to a G bank under
the IRB approach, there exists a kew such that the following separating
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equilibrium exists.
1. G banks switch to the IRB approach, and their capital re-
quirement is k.
2. B banks stay in the old system of standardized approach if
their capital requirement will be k - , where k < kw < kB and the
following equation is satisfied.
V IRB( = 0, k , C) - C= V(/3 = 0, kn)
We want to show that we can find a knew such that the equilibrium, in which G banks
choose to adopt the IRB approach, and B banks have an incentive to stay in the old
system, is a separating Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. That means no bank type has
an incentive to deviate, and bank actions on the equilibrium path are consistent with
the beliefs. Equilibrium beliefs () are,
pu(type=GjIRB Approach) = 1
and
jt(type=BIStandardized Approach) = 1.
For the first part of the proposition, see the proof for Proposition 3, where we showed
that G banks always adopt the IRB approach in order to identify themselves to the
regulator for the parameters of our interest. In other words, G banks have no incentive
to stay in the standardized approach.
For the second part, we need to show that there exists a kw - e such that kw
satisfies the following condition.
VRB(/ = O, k G,CB) -CF = V(/ = , kew) (40)
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where kG < kew < kB .
Analytically, the existence of knew that satisfies (40) such that kG < knew < kB is
trivial. Since the left hand side of the above equality is declining in CB and Cs', and
under the standardized approach C = C = 
VIRB(/3 = 0, kG, CSB) - CF < V(3 = , kG). (41)
Also, we assumed an upper bound on set-up costs (CF) using
VRB(/ = 0, k G, CS) -CF > V(3 = 0, kB) (42)
Since, as we showed in Proposition 1, the value of the B bank is a declining function
of k, equations (41) and (42) imply that there exists a kew where kG < kew < kB,
that
VRB ( = 0, kG ,CS) -CF) = V( = 0, knew).
Therefore, there exists a k*ew-e such that knew satisfies the equation (40), concluding
the proof.
2.7.5 Appendix B.5: Proof of Corollary 6
Corollary 6: Compared to the pooling equilibrium under the standardized
approach (as described in Proposition 1), the separating equilibrium, in
which all the G banks adopt the IRB approach and all the B banks stay in
the standardized approach (as described in Proposition 3), increases the
social welfare function.
The proof is very similar to the proof of the Corollary 2. If the G banks adopt
the IRB approach, their capital requirement decrease to the first-best value, k.
125
Remember that the social welfare function, in any period t, is defined as
SWt = sG(Yt + rLt- )kG
and
d F(E(SWt)) =-sG(7 + 7L - 1) < 0dk V<0
where PV and 7TL are the expected return on good loans to the entrepreneurs and the
"G" banks, respectively.
Therefore, holding equity constant the size of the G banks and consequently social
welfare function increases under the separating equilibrium. This concludes the proof
of the corollary.
2.8 Appendix C
This appendix lists the parameter values used in the numerical simulations that pro-
duce the figures 2.1 - 2.4. Numerical simulations are run because : does not have a
closed form solution, therefore V(/3) can be only numerically solved. Remember that
V() = (1 -df(/))- 1d[g(y) + f(3)(p - I -p(l - k))A0] (43)
where
(44)f(/3) = [( k + (44)
and
g(/) A0 Or exp I 2(k + (45)
The expected return and variance of the good loans are chosen based on the
descriptive statistics of the loan spreads, covered by the Survey of Terms of Business
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Lending over four quarters of 2003. The survey provides quarterly loan-level data on
commercial and industrial loan extensions of about 300 US banks. Risk-free gross
return is normalized to in the paper. Note that, in 2003, the 6-month and 1-
year Treasury rates were, on average, 1.1% and 1.29%, respectively. The capital
requirement is assumed to be binding for the bank, i.e.
Eo = kAo.
Below are the parameter values used in the numerical simulations resulted in the
figures 2.1 - 2.4.66
* Initial Value of the Equity: Eo0 = 0.08
* Capital Requirement Ratio: k = 0.08
* Value of the Risky Assets: A0 Eo = 1k
* Expected Gross Return on Good Loans: TL = {1.0175,1.0375}
* Expected Gross Return on Risky Loans: TM = 1
* Variance of the Good Loans: a = 0.01
* Variance of the Risky Loans:ac2 = 0.1
* Probability that Next Period is not the Last Period of the Bank: d = 0.99
* Deposit Insurance Premium 67: p = {0, 0.0015}
66The shape of the value function is robust to using other parameter values, as well.
67 The fixed-rate premium charged by the FDIC is about 1.25% (See Pennacchi (2005)). Since the
risk-free rate is normalized to zero in this paper, we set the insurance premiums either to zero or
close to zero in our numerical simulations.
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Value of the Bank as a Function of Beta and Variance of Risky Asset
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FIGURE 2.1: This figure shows how the value of the bank, V(3), changes as the
ratio of the investment in safe asset () changes from 0 to 1 and the variance of the return
on risky asset (2) changes from 0.01 to 0.01. The values of the other parameters used are
as follows: E0 = 0.08, k = 0.08, A0 = 1, rL = 1.0175, M = 1.0, UL2 = 0.01, d = 0.99,
and p = 0.0015. Value of the bank, V(3), is as defined in equation (43). Note that, when
the variance of the risky loan is equal to the variance of the good loan, the bank optimally
sets * = 1 because the expected return on the good loan is higher. However, holding other
parameters constant, as the variance of the risky loan increase, 3* changes from 1 to 0. See
the points, corresponding to V(3*) and 3*, identified by diamonds in the figure.
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Value of the Bank as a Function of Beta
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FIGURE 2.2: This figure shows how the value of the bank, V(/3), changes as the
ratio of the investment in the safe loan (3) changes from 0 to 1 for two different values
of the expected return on good loans: L = 1.0175 and L = 1.0375. The values of the
other parameters used are as follows: E = 0.08, k = 0.08, A = 1, M = 1, C = 0 0 1,
0r 2 = 0.1, d := 0.99, and p = 0.0015. The value of the bank, V(3), is as defined in
equation (43). Note that, holding other parameters constant, as the expected return on the
safe loan increase by 2%, the bank's optimal investment switches from 3* = 0 to * = 1.
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First-Best Capital Requirements for the "G" and "B" Banks
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FIGURE 2.3: This figure shows the first-best values of the capital requirements for
the "G" and "B" banks, kG and kB, that satisfy the equations (20) and (21), respec-
tively. On the y-axis is the "expected premiums minus loss" to the deposit insurance fund,
E(InsurancePremium - Loss'), and on the x-axis is the capital requirement ratio, k.
First-best value of the capital requirement for the G and the B bank, kG and kB, make
the expected premiums minus loss on the y-axis equal to zero. The values of the other
parameters used are as follows: E0 = 0.08, k = 0.08, A0 = 1, YL = 1.0375, TM = 1.0,
A = 0.01, u2 = 0.1 d = 0.99, and p = 0.0015. Note that, kG << kB.
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Value of the Bank as a Function of Required Capital
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FIGURE 2.4: This figure shows how the value of the bank, V(/1 ), changes as the
capital requirement, k*, changes from 0.01 to 0.10 for the two types of banks: "G" banks
(with * = 1 and rL = 1.0375) and "B" banks (with /* = 0 and TM = 1). The values of
the other parameters used are as follows: Eo = 0.08, A0 = kEo, a2L = 0.01, c 2 = 0.1,
d = 0.99, and p = 0.0015. The value of the bank, V(3), is as defined in equation (43).
Note that V(3) is a declining function of k for both type of banks.
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